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r/CryptoCurrencySee Post

Update: Ledger NPM Hack (14th Dec 2023)

r/BitcoinSee Post

Ledger's NPM account has been hacked

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I was joking that "*the* malicious code" doesn't say much because there were so many. I assumed you meant this one (the xz backdoor) because it's the most recent majorly reported one that was clearly a backdoor, but backdoored packages are found every few months. Here are just a few random ones I found: [Python](https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/malicious-pypi-package-fastapi-toolkit/), [Python](https://arstechnica.com/security/2023/11/developers-targeted-with-malware-that-monitors-their-every-move/), [VSFTPD](https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/attacksignatures/detail?asid=33416), [NPM](https://www.theregister.com/2022/05/12/npm-attacks-code-white-jfrog/) but "npm package used by <huge number> of dependencies backdoored" has become a meme in the IT security community. And that's just the ones clearly identified as backdoors. Many of the security bugs could have also been introduced intentionally as a backdoor. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Log4Shell was particularly hilarious for many reasons: * It existed for a very long time * It was enabled by creative chaining of features that individually all seemed harmless and useful, i.e. a logic bug and not some random memory corruption. * The handling of it, once discovered, was pretty bad. * It was trivial to exploit and gave the attacker remote code execution (considered the highest level of impact/access). * Once it started to become publicly known, but before the security community really responded in force, it was *widely* exploited not by nation-state actors or criminal hacker groups, but... *kids hacking each other's Minecraft servers*. (I'm not joking, some of the more creative attack variants were first discovered in Minecraft, and while some targeted attempts happened earlier, really wide-scale exploitation was first seen against Minecraft).

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r/BitcoinSee Comment

Such as NPM

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r/BitcoinSee Comment

Wallets have been hacked, especially in the early days with not-random entropy generators, and more recently with not-random signature nonces A malicious coder took over a minor NPM repository which had been abandoned by its developer. As a minor dependency for several javascript Bitcoin wallet apps, it was an opportunity to exfiltrate Bitcoin keys from users' wallets. And it was open source In 2010, someone defeated the controlled supply mechanism with a transaction that made billions of extra Bitcoin > that original wallet, the first one with millions in it, that was open in 2009 No such thing. Please stop repeating this myth

Mentions:#NPM
r/CryptoCurrencySee Comment

Sounds to me like they are blindly pulling dependencies from NPM and trusting that upstream maintainers are not malicious or compromised. In other words, the software is at least partly open source, it seems the former employee is maintaining an upstream dependency.

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r/BitcoinSee Comment

I can at least give some quick definitions to start to shed light: - CDN: “Content Delivery Network” - NPM: “Node Package Manager” - - in this context, NPM is an example of a CDN (NPM is a CDN, but not the other way around)

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r/BitcoinSee Comment

To get started I guess I have to find a five year old and ask what "CDN named NPM" means.

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r/BitcoinSee Comment

Recently (maybe after this comment) it was disclosed that the attack started through a ledger employee with the account `@CET` on NPM. Though I agree that any publishing task that `@CET` had authority on was a risk, I'm not seeing that this user published any other packages recently. Is there another reason why this risk isn't contained to the packages `@CET` maintained

Mentions:#CET#NPM
r/BitcoinSee Comment

I disagree. The Dec 14th exploit effected all wallets that used un-frozen NPM packages that user `@CET` had NPM publishing rights to. There is no indication that `@CET` has publishing privledges on dependencies any other wallets like coldcard. My feel is that this is a Ledger only problem, since those where the only dependencies hit, and there is no indication that other HW wallet makers are as carefree with rolling releases of dependencies or retention of credentials.

Mentions:#NPM#CET
r/CryptoCurrencySee Comment

how is it possible to believe this, when a compromised ex-employee account was able to update such a critical library on NPM? they most probably had no relevant security in place. *The standard practice at Ledger is that no single person can deploy code without review by multiple parties. We have strong access controls, internal reviews, and code multi-signatures when it comes to most parts of our development. This is the case in 99% of our internal systems.*

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r/BitcoinSee Comment

The attack was launched on CDN `jsdelivr.net`. No word if multiple CDNs were attacked, or if multiple packages on those CDNs were attacked. Too many unknowns. As the tweet suggests, crypto wallets really need to using version locking / freezing to get out of these type of NPM leftpad issues.

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r/CryptoCurrencySee Comment

Working theory is that somebody hacked `jsdelivr.net` and replaced `@ledgerhq/connect-kit` v1.1.4 with bogus versions (.5 to .7). The bad versions don't show up on NPM so it seems dependent upon what CDN was used. No word from admins at `jsdelivr` as to how this happened. https://github.com/LedgerHQ/connect-kit/issues/29 For app developers, remember to freeze known good upstreams where possible over using rolling releases. Tons more maintence, but tons safer too.

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r/BitcoinSee Comment

> Please explain this to me like a 5 year old - Ledger compromised Ledger published their code to what is called a CDN named NPM. Attacking a CDN is, unfortunately, getting rather common. Attack goes like this: 1. Ledger makes code on github 2. Ledger builds code and publishes the binary to a CDN 3. Others include the binary from CDN because it's better bandwidth than github 4. Attacker hacks CDN and sends a fake "upgrade" to the binary 5. Others including the binary fail to put a version number on the include 6. Those failing to include the version, get the malware To avoid this, wallet developers (Ledger included) need to perform what's called "freezes" where they lock the version of code tested so that "upstream" updates don't trickle into their apps. It was extreamly easy to spot since the last version of the package on github was 1.1.4 yet the CDN rolled to 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.1.7. That's a huge red flag and should have been (and was) caught by any developer auditing dependencies.

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r/CryptoCurrencySee Comment

Ledger NPM hack details: https://github.com/LedgerHQ/connect-kit/issues/29

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r/BitcoinSee Comment

Over the years malicious backdoors have been inserted into bitcoin wallets like [bitpay/copay](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bitpay-copay-wallet-compromised-malicious-120900206.html), and more recently into Specter by NPM dependencies. I have been dice rolling my mnemonic seeds since Coldcard Mk1

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