SBC

-Authorised-

Fair points, and I'll take them head-on rather than dodge. SBC: yes, 2025 SBC was \~$51M. But two things. It's falling fast - it was \~$74M in 2024, so they cut it by a third in a year. And even if you fully expense every dollar of it against FCF, you still get \~$53M of clean FCF. Against a \~$140M enterprise value that's under 3x. The thesis holds even on your stricter measure. Dilution: the buyback authorization (\~$59.5M remaining) is ongoing and the trailing 12-month share count is now down, not up. The SBC is being mopped up, not left to run wild. The Q1 declines: active buyers down 18% and marketplace revenue down 14% are the low-value $5-gig transactional junk rolling off by design. That IS the thesis. Over the same period services revenue grew 30% and spend per buyer rose 15%. They're trading a pile of tiny gigs for fewer high-value projects. Revenue optics look worse, unit economics look better. Is it sustainable? They guide FY2026 adjusted EBITDA of $60-80M in a year they are openly calling a heavy investment/reset year. A business throwing off that kind of cash while re-architecting itself, with net cash worth most of the market cap, is not priced for "maybe the FCF holds." It's priced for terminal decline. Those are very different things, and that gap is the trade.

New_Sympathy5203

Cheap? Maybe. But the post ignores the main risk. 2025 FCF was 103M, but SBC was 51M, and shares still increased despite buybacks. In Q1 2026, active buyers fell 18%, marketplace revenue fell 14% and FCF fell 23%. So the question isn’t whether Fiverr looks cheap on last year's FCF. It’s whether that FCF is sustainable.

Routine-District-588

I think all of them are crazy strong. i own microsoft too. if amazon wasn't dilluting shareholders with SBC it would also be a buy for me..

Sanpaku

OP doesn't understand who sell-side analysts are working for. Traders that set stops can do well buying dips. Longer term investors are better served by waiting until valuation, confidence in management and price action are in alignment. MSFT presently trades at a 2.56% FCF yield (ttm), closer to 1.78% once share repurchases to counter SBC dilution is accounted for. Little confidence in management, given the malinvestment in gen AI and Copilot debacle. Since early November, its only been above its 50d SMA mid-April to early June. Or just DCAing into broad market indices.

-Authorised-

On dilution / “no money, no raises” The BRPC II agreement is a pre‑agreed equity line set up in mid‑2025 to fund fleet growth and working capital, not a panic cash raise. As of Q1 2026 they’d issued only 260,628 shares under that facility out of 11,080,332 approved – that’s roughly 0.4% of the share count actually drawn, with the rest just registered in case they want optional growth capital later. Calling that “no dilution ever” is sloppy wording; calling it “meaningful dilution” is also a stretch. The diluted share count moving from \~58M to \~64M is also not “they printed 6M shares into the market”. Diluted EPS uses a bigger denominator because it assumes options/warrants get exercised. That’s accounting, not necessarily 10.3% more stock already out there. On buybacks: in theory, yes, buybacks could offset SBC. In practice, a small asset‑light platform in a multi‑year tanker upcycle is usually better off using surplus capital to expand its fee base (more ships, more voyages) than to shrink the float at this early stage. You can disagree with the capital allocation, but “they must need money” is not the only explanation. On CEO / insider buying The “he’s only buying to avoid delisting” theory doesn’t line up with the timeline. He was already buying before the Nasdaq notice arrived, he owns roughly 45% through direct and indirect holdings, and he kept adding even after the stock moved back over the $1 threshold. If this were just about job security optics, you would expect the buying to stop once compliance was restored. You’re absolutely right that insiders can dump later; nobody is saying they are physically incapable of selling. The point is that right now you have: • a CEO who already controls the company, • adding on top of that at market prices, • while repeatedly saying on video he intends to hold. Tight insider ownership + tiny float does create real information asymmetry and volatility risk. That’s a valid risk flag. But using the same insider buying both as “proof” of manipulation and as something to ignore because “he might sell one day” is internally inconsistent. On profitability and the cash pile You’re correct that Q1 2026 benefited from very strong tanker rates and high vessel utilisation. It’s fair to say the business is cycle‑exposed. The numbers still matter though: • Revenue up \~200%+ YoY • Net income from roughly –6M to +2.8M in a year • EPS from \~0.01 estimate to \~0.06 reported • Cash at 27.6M, zero financial debt On the “cash pile nearly majority of mcap”: you’re right that the precise number was \~39% at the time (27.6M cash vs \~70.8M market cap). “Nearly majority” is marketing language; “around 40% of market cap in cash” is the clean way to say it. I’m happy to stick with that wording going forward. Where your comment leaves an important piece out is how management itself frames the drivers: • The CEO has said on record that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was “shocking” and essentially a bonus, not the base case. • On the same set of appearances he said Q1 would be profitable and Q2 would be bigger than Q1’s \~2.8M net income, and then Q1 delivered exactly what he’d guided. So yes, Q1 rode a strong cycle – but management is explicitly saying the underlying tanker market has legs and that the Hormuz situation is an extra tailwind on top, not the only reason they made money. You can still decide you don’t buy that guidance, but it’s not accurate to act as if the company is pretending Q1 was achieved in “normal” conditions or that they’re ignoring cycle risk. On “they clearly need money” The fairest criticism in your post is: “they haven’t yet proven they can stay profitable if the cycle normalises.” That’s true and exactly why Q2/Q3 will matter. What isn’t supported is the idea that: • a 0.4% draw on an equity line, • in a company with \~27.6M cash and no debt, is proof that they’re desperate for cash right now. It’s simply not a binary “either they never issue a share or they’re broke” situation. If you want to attack the thesis, the real angles are: • How long the current tanker upcycle lasts. • Whether management actually executes on the growth plan. • Whether they keep capital allocation disciplined as cash builds. Those are serious questions. “They issued 0.4% of shares and therefore need money” and “CEO buying automatically equals pump‑and‑dump” are weaker ones.

FreudMayweatherIII

Oh hey, it's you again. I still have the same questions from your last post a week ago. RE: "No money, or dilution or raises" If they don't need money, then why continue issuing stock? Their diluted shares literally increased by 10.3% over the last quarter from 58 M to 64 M, and the common shares also increased. Last quarter's earnings reported 260 628 shares issued out of a total approved 11 080 332 shares @ $1.27 (which implies they think $1.27 is an attractive price to sell at). Why would they issue new shares to raise cash if they already have a cash pile and apparently don't need money? Why couldn't they use that cash pile and buy back shares instead to balance out the SBC dilution while also increasing the share price at the same time? They are doing the opposite. By continuing to issue stock at these valuations implies: 1) HMR needs money and/or 2) the executive board is misallocating capital. Which one is it? RE: CEO/Insider buying If I were CEO, and my job's existence depends on maintaining its stock price >$1, I too would also be buying shares above market price so my company doesn't get delisted and I lose my job. Not only does this boost the stock price, it is also good optics. Unfortunately, just because the CEO says he doesn't plan on selling, doesn't mean he will hold forever, and a large accumulation of shares by insiders eventually becomes a liability, and a set up for a pump and dump or price manipulation. Think about it: 90% of the supply of HMR shares are held by those with insider information and direct control over the company's operations, <1% institutional, and the rest are retail. In other words, the board needs retail money to come in so they can exit because the institutions aren't biting (I wonder why). This is some insane information asymmetry. Some people already distrust financial institutional ownership and allege that they can manipulate stock prices, now imagine what they could do if they also had insider information and executive control. RE: "Now profitable with a cash pile nearly at majority of mcap" HMR required high charter rates and shipping volumes that you typically only see during the peaks of the shipping cycle to generate a small profit, and hasn't proven profitability outside of these tailwinds. I would not call this "totally clean". Also, cash was $27.6 M, market cap is $70.8 M. 27.6/70.8 = 38.8% which is technically "nearly at majority" but I guess saying \~40% is less convincing. Yes, that is still a large amount and could suggest that HMR is being overpunished and could probably be a swing trade in the short term, but has near zero impact regarding the company's profitability long term. RE: "Your ai is wrong (about needing money)" This is the truest statement. Remember, "ChatGPT can make mistakes. Check important info." Are you sure they don't need money? Because when I check the important info, it seems like they do.

mycroftitswd

Natural sellers gone, natural buyers arrived/anticipated Huge post IPO selling is mostly over: Pre IPO investors have mostly exited except Advance Publications (long term owner) and Spez (CEO) , large pre-lpo stock grants mostly finished vesting. Short interest staring to decrease since end Feb. . Float stabilised at approx 75%. SBC will normalise by year end. Profitable. Therefore S&P500 inclusion is starting to look realistic. When models predict high enough likelihood, 20-30M shares will be bought by front-runners and benchmarking funds long before inclusion is announced, and short sellers get out of the way. Share buybacks happened at $146ish. A director bought in March at $150 and below. With sell side consensus estimates, DCF models and price metrics put fair value above $160. Licensing deals with Google and Openai must be renegotiated by Q1 2027. Upside catalyst. Because of above, significant dips are being bought and rallies aren't being used by early investors to cash out.

ohgodthehorror95

Yes but not all software, which is why I'm invested in specific companies rather than a software ETF. I'm very bullish on cybersecurity. Buying the dip on PANW under $150 was a no brainer for instance. However some of these companies kinda suck. WIX is a zero because their business (building a website) will 100% be disrupted by AI. TEAM is trash because of the crazy amount of SBC. I'm far more optimistic on enterprise software companies as well as ones that operate in niche areas less likely to be disrupted.

DeRham92

I think the accounting standard for SBC are a bit misleading. If you look at SBC for applovin you see very small number, so the FCF net SBC is very high. However if you look at the trend in total shares outstanding you see that the number is not decreasing after 2023. This is due to the "Stock issued in connection with equity awards" reported in "Condensed Consolidated Statements of Stockholders’ Equity": in 2024 and 2025 the total amount of shares buyback just cancel out the stock issued for equity awards. This means that there was no capital returned to shareholders and since 2023 the entire free cash flow was used to avoid diluition. I think that this divergence between the accounting value of SBC and the cost of shares buyback is due to the big appreciation registered by the stock: new stocks issued in 24 and 25 were accounted in SBC years before, due to the vesting period when the price was low. Then at the end of vesting period they were recognized as outstanding stocks and the company did buybacks to keep this number constant. So maybe this will not be a problem for the future because if it is still the case that SBC and actual stock issued diverge that means the price of the stock is up a lot. Otherwise if the stock price does not grow the buybacks should reduce the outstanding stocks. What do you think? Does it make sense?

hseeman_sf

There are are number of things you need to look at in 10K, not just in isolation but reading 2-3 years of 10Ks sequentially, very hard to do it without tools. That said, LLMs are great at precisely this kind of work. You could ask the LLM to do the following (this is not an exhaustive list by any means, add/delete as you see fit for your own process): * **Gross Margin Trajectory:** Extract 3-year gross margins; flag any compression relative to revenue growth. * **Operating Leverage:** Identify fixed vs. variable costs and evidence of declining customer acquisition costs. * **Capital Efficiency:** Calculate Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and track CapEx as a percentage of revenue growth. * **Shareholder Dilution:** Calculate YoY share count growth and Stock-Based Compensation (SBC) as a percentage of operating cash flow. * **Customer Concentration:** Flag any single client accounting for >10% of total revenue. * **Accounting Red Flags:** Identify changes in revenue recognition (Notes 1/2) or shifts toward capitalizing rather than expensing development costs. * **Unique Vulnerabilities:** Extract non-boilerplate risks (e.g., single-supplier reliance, third-party platform dependency). * **Narrative Drift:** Compare the MD&A to the prior year and list any strategic initiatives that quietly disappeared.

GloveBrilliant1190

First of all, I think WEN is fundamentally different than GME/AMC. I posted DD you can find on the sub a couple days ago but they're not at all comparable. But a healthy stock price helps a business in a couple ways. One, you can attract better talent since stock based comp will be more attractive. You also don't need to mint as many new shares when you provide SBC to employees. And the second way is by selling equity at the market if the share price rises significantly. If WEN were to go to say, $30/share, management could create new shares out of thin air, sell them on the open market, and then use that cash to pay down debt. That instantly creates more free cash flow by lowering your net interest expense

Routine-District-588

I just hate SBC model of the SAAS companies. they were extremly expensive, now they less expensive but not cheap or anything like that. there are some unicorns that are extremly cheap like adobe but shady things going there with ceo leaving and cfo too. Just for example NOW the darling of saas is like 50 P/E. Like wtf bruh? i'd rather just buy microsofot for saas play.

-axelrod

Thanks for the update! I've been following your posts on GRPN recently and taken a small position so far after Thursday's action. I'm from the UK so the SumUp aspect has always been the key aspect to me, however the moves to leverage AI will hopefully decrease their Opex as well as their share buyback program. I wasn't sure if they were cancelling shares as part of the buyback, or just using it to fund SBC.

dreggers

You really think companies can just dilute their shareholders, stop buybacks, and issue debt for free? The man reason they were valued so high previously was due to their immaculate balance sheets. The other issue is SBC which continues to be very high and hidden from the income statement

half-coldhalf-hot

SBC? Son of Baconators?

afishinacar

I know an ex Wendy's exec. As far as I know he held onto all his SBC over the years. I hope you guys can pump it up enough so I can tell him to offload his bags onto you guys.

teddykon

The stock is a bit interesting because if Evan ever sees the light and decides to completely abandon hardware and focus solely on his social media app, the stock could literally triple But I’d rather not invest in hoping a CEO with 100% voting control sees the light. He already treats the company like a massive piggy bank ($1-$1.3B in annual SBC) and he regularly sells stock. The man has enough money to sail off into the sunset and has no incentive to change his ways

ThinkingOfTheOldDays

Pricing power, no more cash free SBC to attract engineers, and they'll have to expend in AI investments  Shrinking sales, higher expense, really high starting multiples 

Smooth-Gene17

SBC was stripped down in early 2025. Nowhere near 60% now

ThinkingOfTheOldDays

Saas decline is from expectations about declining seat revenue, difficulty of migrating to usage based pricing, pricing power issues in general, AND increased expenses for AI investment, AND declining ability to monetize share price w/ SBC. AND hit to terminal value as most of the software tools aren't durable enough to last 5 to 10 years. 

ByClaviqo

That makes sense, buybacks offsetting SBC. This is actually the cleaner way to manage it. Curious what rate you're modelling for the buybacks going forward given the current valuation.

OilAny787

Current buy backs in my projection are offsetting the dilution from SBC so a slight reduction over the period. As said in the post, if you want the details drop us a message!

ByClaviqo

There is one more thing worth adding, SBC. Their layoff isn´t just about the headcount costs. Fewer employees also mean fewer future equity grants, which matter ´cause dilution has been a quiet drag on HOOD shareholders for a while. That said: shares already vesting don´t vanish, so short term impact is minimal. At 47x PE there´s no room for dilution to outrun growth. What´s your share count trend looking like?

Scary-Oven8260

Palatir was one of the few GAAP profitable companies 3 years ago. Meanwhile companies like snow are still not GAAP profitable today. All profit going to SBC

ohgodthehorror95

Most of the ones he listed have at least half-decent financials. Except for TEAM. They've been in operation for like 25 years and they're still not GAAP profitable and issue a shitton of SBC

SuperSultan

If they laid off 20% of their workforce, the company would collapse. You’re acting like it’s not poorly managed enough already. And people care about net earnings and FCF not EBITDA. Since this is a tech company I’d even ignore FCF too. The real number is what you get when you subtract SBC from FCF.

Acceptable-Friend-92

The app is one of the highest quality consumer app. Ask any college kid. There's a reason why they have 50% DAU/MAU ratio. But the company management is definitely garbage for focusing on SBC vs growing the valuation!

Acceptable-Friend-92

What's your logic? $8B valuation for a company with 6.5B revenue, growing at 15%, 1B users, EBIDTA positive and a couple hundred million in free cashflow. SBC is an issue, but that's not unique to Snap among its peers.

Acceptable-Friend-92

Yeah. SBC is definitely a problem. But it's something they can fix. They have a new CFO, hopefully he's more sane!

LDNBrickTop

This isn’t SBC

nemesis24k

While Salesforce is a decent product, I feel the company overall is run very poorly - makes a bunch of questionable acquisitions, only because they can, high SBC for acquisitions, they are using much needed cash for stock repurchase - 14 % reduction this year. In a year where Google is reaching out to bond market to raise cash for AI, Salesforce is using debt to buy back stock. The operating margin is still in the teens after improving from single digits a few years ago- is this the best a industry leader can do? Maybe it's smart but for me, it makes no sense.

MarthaJulietta

Yeah I definitely got burned and was jaded. They had negative YOY revenue/net income numbers and while that didn’t change, the price has. It was ~$60 then and it’s $40 now. I’m still not thrilled with the new CEO I don’t trust he’s the right guy to build out new initiatives but if he can find even 500M of savings a year vs the 1.5B he claims and add a little value through other vectors, that’s enough to keep cash flows steady or slightly increasing going forward and that’s enough to return massive shareholder value in a market that is diluting and taking on huge debts and running very hot. At this price the risk:reward vs the market seems weighted very heavily in PayPals favor. Buybacks now take the company private in 6.5 years including SBC and the dividend has gone from .9% to 1.35% both of which are pretty fantastic.

ddp26

You're right. SBC doesn't impact cash burn rate. It changes the GAAP net loss line that investors look at when pricing the multiple post-IPO

sexy_balloon

why would SBC impact cash burn rate?

sportingpool

sure you have..... you can look at basic shares outstanding as well. went up 10m yoy. multiply 10m new shares with share price ($200), which is 2bn. then compare with what they call SBC expense last 12 months: about 500m. and whoops...... suddenly there is a gap of 1.5bn

sportingpool

the main SBC program is from 2023, and so the stock price used for the expense is way too low. and you know that. you play the innocent fool here

wuhanabe

How is SBC backdated? It amortizes over the vesting period? You will have to give more info than that.

sportingpool

gaap is nonsense as well if a company, like reddit does, uses a lot of (backdated) SBC.

sportingpool

i own a few shares, but significantly less than i used to because of 1) SBC, 2) their communication, and now 3) this revenue growth issue

Ok-Recommendation925

I'm in ServiceNow, but I wouldn't go around getting people to buy. People hate it because they say the platform/product sucks. But that's because their corporate Dev team, those people hired to implement the platform in their own companies, suck. Almost every good (not great) Dev Team that implemented it with clear overhead guidance, has said amazing things about it. Also the ticker is associated with Trump, where emotional investors who have a hard on against him, would shun $NOW With that said, I'm observing their quarterly GAAP earnings and whether it improves after taking into consideration their high SBC proportion. Holding 355 shares cumulative @$132.38 avg per share. $5,500 more cash to deploy.

Gloomy_Necesary

What do you guys think Spez is going to talk about during his BofA fireside chat tonight? Im expecting updates on share buyback program and potentially and hopefully limits on SBC. Potentially some hints at AI data deals

FarrisAT

This means Google can issue 2% less overall net shares in SBC while also retaining tax advantage. It’s only net harmful to EPS if you assume they don’t issue SBC.

Personal_Repair_3579

Looked at $PATH through a benchmarking tool out of curiousity and honestly the underlying numbers are cleaner than I expected. 82.7% gross margin - that's genuinely strong, well above what you'd expect even for SaaS. Operating cash flow is $320M and CapEx is basically nothing (\~$15M), so they're generating real free cash. Not accounting tricks. That said, the buyback math is a little sus - they repurchased $390M last year, which is actually *more* than their free cash flow. So either they're burning through reserves, or a chunk of that is just offsetting stock comp dilution rather than actually shrinking share count. The guys raising the SBC concern in this thread aren't wrong. GAAP operating income is still negative (-$162M), but that's pretty standard for a company still investing at this pace. R&D is 26.6% of revenue - they're spending hard. Basically the business itself works. The question is just whether RPA is already becoming obsolete faster than Maestro can replace it. That's not a financial question, that's a product bet.

Jealous_Bookkeeper20

The bear case on PATH is that RPA is fundamentally a transitional technology. If enterprise clients can build custom AI agents via API, the need to pay for and maintain complex UIPath desktop scraping scripts disappears. Maestro is a pivot to agentic workflows, but it is still layered on top of their legacy RPA footprint. Also, look at their share dilution. Even with the $243M stock buyback, they are mostly just offsetting their massive stock-based compensation (SBC) drag rather than reducing net share count to return capital. Are you looking at GAAP profitability and share count dilution, or just focusing on non-GAAP free cash flow?

Prethiraj

They dilute $20 Billion per year with SBC

sunburn74

I'm tired of the how the ultra wealthy skirt taxes. SBC and the rise in buybacks is one way they are doing it. 

iloveaccounting64

ChatGPT rates ur dd shit: As a WSB post, it’s entertaining. As an investment thesis, it’s pretty weak. I’d break it down into what is **signal** vs **hype**. **The Good Parts (Actual Bull Case)** **1. Figma genuinely has a moat** This is probably the strongest argument in the entire post. Figma won because it wasn’t just a design tool. It became the workflow and collaboration layer between: Designers Engineers PMs Stakeholders Once an enterprise standardizes around Figma, switching costs become real. This is similar to: Atlassian with Jira Microsoft with Office ServiceNow with workflows The moat isn’t “drawing rectangles.” The moat is that everyone works there. **2. AI probably helps Figma more than hurts it** This part is actually interesting. Most bears assume: AI builds apps → nobody needs designers → Figma dies. But reality may be: AI builds apps → more software gets created → more design decisions → more collaboration → more need for Figma. You saw this happen with coding. People thought AI would kill coding. Instead: More code is being written More software projects exist Developers use more tools than ever Figma could benefit similarly. **3. Management is ambitious** Dylan Field deserves credit. The company beat Adobe’s attempt to dominate the market. That’s not easy. The failed acquisition by Adobe itself validates how valuable Figma became. The post is right that Dylan thinks bigger than “design software.” He wants Figma to become the software creation layer. Whether he succeeds is another question. **The Weak Parts** **1. “Dylan is a genius therefore stock goes up”** This is where the DD starts turning into a cult. A huge portion of the post is basically: Dylan good. Dylan smart. Dylan dropped out. Dylan visionary. Buy stock. That’s not analysis. The market already knows Dylan is talented. You don’t get alpha from knowing the CEO is smart. You get alpha from knowing something the market is missing. **2. No valuation discussion** This is the biggest problem. The author never discusses: Revenue multiple FCF multiple Enterprise value Margins Future dilution SBC Nothing. You could have the greatest company on Earth and still be a terrible investment if you pay too much. This is the exact mistake people made with: Snowflake Datadog Cloudflare Great businesses. Terrible entries at certain prices. **3. The “epicenter of software creation” claim is unproven** This is the core leap of faith. The author assumes: Figma → Design Tool then Figma → Design + Code then Figma → Entire Software Operating System then Figma → Massive valuation expansion That’s a lot of assumptions. Today, the coding layer is still controlled by: Microsoft (VS Code/GitHub) Anthropic OpenAI Google Figma hasn’t proven it can dominate that layer. **4. 50-100% by end of summer is basically pulled from thin air** This is classic WSB. No model. No numbers. No valuation framework. Just vibes. A stock can absolutely double. But the DD never explains why the market cap should be 50% or 100% higher. **What I Think The Real Bull Thesis Is** If I were writing the institutional version of this DD, it’d be: Figma owns the collaboration layer of software design. AI increases software creation volume. Design becomes more important, not less. Figma expands from design into adjacent workflows. Revenue growth stays elevated for years. Margins expand significantly. Market awards premium software multiple. That’s a legitimate thesis. The problem is the post spends 80% of its words talking about Dylan Field’s giant brain and 20% talking about the business.

sunburn74

SBC should also be outlawed in my opinion. Any gain of stock that did not involve a direct purchase outside of founding ownership shares should be outlawed. Buybacks also reduce tax income that would have otherwise gone to the government. We run massive government deficits when we simply could outlaw buybacks and get some of that back.

rargghh

well when you look at their SBC, they kinda needed to do that

trash-trader

SBC means stock based compensation, its not a ticker

Glittering_Water3645

Adobe is traded at about a forward 8% free cash flow yield adjusted for stock based compensation. Their RPO (contracted revenue to be realised within the next 12 month) is increasing by +12% YoY so they company isn´t "dying" in any sense in the next 12 months atleast. The question you should ask yourself. 1. Will their cost of revenue and SBC increase slower or faster than the revenue? 2. Will they be able to take a small margin on LLM usage within their ecosystem and will users prefer using LLMs within their ecosystem for a small extra cost in that case? 3. Do you believe adobe will be able to defend their market share going forward? I have a small position (3% bought at 234$/share) because of the high ROIC, ROE, market dominance (BTB), amount of share buybacks, forward guidance of 12-18% EPS growth, balance sheet, sticky products with long contracts and stable increasing revenue/earnings even in recessions. There´re real risks but also several good things in the numbers, specially relative to the valuation. That´s why it´s a small position for me. It´s the only SaaS company I own today.

Salt_Yak_3866

I hear you, but those points don’t match the actual numbers. **Moat:** In UCaaS the moat is *recurring revenue + switching friction + channel partners*. CXDO’s RPO just jumped from **$89M to $135M** with double‑digit organic growth. That’s not what “no moat” looks like. **Dilution:** They’ve posted **11 straight GAAP‑profitable quarters** with **positive operating cash flow**. SBC is normal for SaaS, and they’re not issuing shares to “finance debt.” They secured a **$5M term loan + $5M revolver** and haven’t touched either. **Balance sheet:** No distress, no liquidity crunch, no debt spiral. They raised optionality *before* needing it - which is like having a credit card with a large limit and no balance - but if they can buy something and it is accretive to earnings which is what that optionality is for - then that "optionality" is a wise choice. It's ok to disagree on valuation or strategy, but the “diluting like crazy / no moat / debt financing” narrative doesn’t line up with the filings or the conference call transcript.

PunchTornado

hmm. another thing that is on my mind is SBC-Adjusted FCF (TTM): (approx -$231) million. seems like they give a lot of shares to employees.

Dramatic_Agency_8721

SBC is in net income already, right?

Glittering_Water3645

Forward PE is above 40 incl SBC. You have to adjust for stock based compansation for these SaaS companies

Personal_Repair_3579

Ran BB through a benchmarking tool out of curiosity. Mixed picture honestly. The bull case has legs: 73.8% gross margin (71st percentile vs 176 software peers), and OCF is up 500%+ YoY with FCF finally turning positive. Balance sheet is cleaner than people think - debt coverage ranks 82nd percentile. But revenue is down 29.5% YoY, bottom 8th percentile. 3Y CAGR is -9.4%. Rule of 40 is -28. Moat score is 42/100 -"developing," not strong. And SBC is 155% of operating cash flow, so the "cashflow machine" framing needs some asterisks. QNX moat narrative isn't wrong - it's just that the financials are still catching up to it. Optionality bet, not a fundamentals play. Size accordingly.

JustBrowsinAndVibin

They definitely are. *excluding SBC

notreallydeep

*excluding SBC

tdewault95

Thanks for pointing this out. This is a setup I’ve only seen once before and crushed it. Thank you. Only thing I’m not a huge fan of is how many shares are being added. I understand SBC is still a major factor is SaaS, but it taints my viewpoint.

notreallydeep

>Anthropic has stated that they will be profitable eo Q2, rumors are that they already are. On operating income excluding SBC. In other words: they will not be profitable.

Almost_a_Noob

SBC is decreasing each quarter and isn’t even that high anymore especially compared to other software companies

Kaiser-Rotbart

Yeah I think your position is a reasonable one. Just not one that I share. I think SBC is one of the reasons tech has had so much success.

jrodshoots

lol he couldn’t cut operating costs much more at Reddit. But yeah SBC would be the first thing he’d chop

Internal-Science2137

the gross margins are real but SBC is quietly diluting shareholders. check whether diluted share count is actually shrinking or just flat from buybacks

Flame1808mk

the SBC thing is real smh. printing money and still scooping big comp packages on top of it

jrodshoots

I would rather pay them in the same amount of cash and they can choose to buy shares on the open market if they believe the company will do well. I can't stand insider SBC and seeing them selling for anything but taxes. But it's fine to disagree :)

Kaiser-Rotbart

I completely disagree with that philosophically. They’re still growing rapidly. You want your employees to be incentivized to help the company do well. Tech figured out a long time ago you can get more out of people with equity involved. They would get shit talent without SBC.

jrodshoots

Oh I'm sure it is. I just don't agree with SBC if the company is profitable. As a shareholder I would rather pay them in cash to not dilute my own future equity now Reddit is raking it in.

Kaiser-Rotbart

Some dude on the redditstock sub just did a pretty good analysis showing Reddit is squarely in the middle of its peer set on SBC. And it’s declining. This narrative keeps getting cited but I don’t think it’s accurate.

ECHuSTLe

My thesis has changed and now I’m trapped. Google search change, countries banning social media under 16, meta rival app, UK fines, insider selling bcuz excessive SBC, regulatory scrutiny, no new LLM deals since 2024. Want me to keep going? There’s no catalyst for this junk.

rummuio

Turbo tax looks under pressure, this is the real strategic fear. Management said TurboTax online paying units only +2%, but total TurboTax Online units is down \~2% and share of e-files expected to decline \~1 point. Also there is pressure in more price-sensitive customers That suggests they are making more money from higher ARPU, not necessarily from stronger unit growth. It makes you ask if TurboTax is growing because the moat is stronger… or because Intuit is charging more to a shrinking/maturing user base? Add on Turbo Tax missed expectations in its most important quarter. Whilst QuickBooks was strong, the management said higher effective prices, mix-shift, ARPU improvement......makes you wonder how much is real customer expansion vs pricing power? Random one that jumped out to me, stock based comp is huge at 1.55b. Its normal for a software company to give SBC....but made me ask if buybacks really creating shareholder value, or offsetting dilution, because share volumes have been increasing over the years.

mathaiser

I'm sorry but this is complete bullshit. Here's why: 1. ⁠Start with where the numbers actually came from. Anthropic did not publish a financial statement. Every outlet is reporting figures that were, in the wording of the coverage, "shared during an ongoing funding round" and "told to investors." That is the single most important fact in the story and the one the headlines bury. You are not looking at a company's reported results. 2. ⁠The quarter has not happened. Today is May 21, 2026. The "first profitable quarter" is the June quarter — Q2 2026 — which is not over. The $10.9B revenue figure and the $559M operating profit are forecasts. The verbs in the coverage give it away: "expects to," "is projected to," "is on track to," "is about to." A headline announcing a profitable quarter that has not closed is reporting an intention, not an outcome. You would never let a company you were underwriting book a result you hadn't seen settle; this is the same thing dressed as news. 3. ⁠The profit metric is explicitly non-standard, and the non-standardness is favorable by construction. The reported operating profit "includes model training costs but excludes stock-based compensation." For a company like Anthropic, stock-based compensation is one of the largest real economic costs of running the business, and excluding it from "operating profit" is not a conservative or even neutral choice. Whoever defined that metric chose a denominator of costs that produces a positive number. $559M of "profit" on $10.9B of revenue is a ~5% margin; if SBC is anywhere near the scale typical of a frontier lab in an active funding round, that thin margin plausibly inverts to a loss under GAAP. A metric that flips sign depending on which real expense you include is a marketing metric. 4. ⁠The "revenue" itself is doing unspecified work. The coverage swings between a $10.9B quarterly figure, a $43-44B annualized run rate, and a separate $30B "annualized revenue" claim from a different commentator. These are not the same thing. They are conflating recognized quarterly revenue with run-rate. There is also no disclosure of gross-versus-net treatment. A large share of Anthropic's revenue flows through cloud-provider marketplaces (AWS, GCP). Whether a dollar of customer spend that passes through a reseller is booked gross or net materially changes the headline number, and a leaked deck will not tell you which convention is in use. Without that, "$10.9B" is not a defined quantity. 5. ⁠The timing is the tell. These figures surfaced "amidst an ongoing funding round expected to value the startup above OpenAI." The function of leaking flattering forward projections during a raise is to support the price of the equity being sold. It means the disclosure was selected, timed, and framed by a party with a direct financial interest in your believing it. You should apply the same discount you'd apply to any seller's own description of the asset.

InvestmentBiker

The Anthropic headline reads bullish, but the fine print is doing most of the work. These “first profitable quarter” numbers are leaked mid‑raise, based on a quarter that hasn’t closed yet, and use a custom profit metric that conveniently excludes stock‑based compensation – for a frontier lab where SBC is one of the biggest real economic costs.

kingjdin

I'm sorry but this is complete bullshit. Here's why: 1. Start with where the numbers actually came from. Anthropic did not publish a financial statement. Every outlet is reporting figures that were, in the wording of the coverage, "shared during an ongoing funding round" and "told to investors." That is the single most important fact in the story and the one the headlines bury. You are not looking at a company's reported results. 2. The quarter has not happened. Today is May 21, 2026. The "first profitable quarter" is the June quarter — Q2 2026 — which is not over. The $10.9B revenue figure and the $559M operating profit are forecasts. The verbs in the coverage give it away: "expects to," "is projected to," "is on track to," "is about to." A headline announcing a profitable quarter that has not closed is reporting an intention, not an outcome. You would never let a company you were underwriting book a result you hadn't seen settle; this is the same thing dressed as news. 3. The profit metric is explicitly non-standard, and the non-standardness is favorable by construction. The reported operating profit "includes model training costs but excludes stock-based compensation." For a company like Anthropic, stock-based compensation is one of the largest real economic costs of running the business, and excluding it from "operating profit" is not a conservative or even neutral choice. Whoever defined that metric chose a denominator of costs that produces a positive number. $559M of "profit" on $10.9B of revenue is a \~5% margin; if SBC is anywhere near the scale typical of a frontier lab in an active funding round, that thin margin plausibly inverts to a loss under GAAP. A metric that flips sign depending on which real expense you include is a marketing metric. 4. The "revenue" itself is doing unspecified work. The coverage swings between a $10.9B quarterly figure, a $43-44B annualized run rate, and a separate $30B "annualized revenue" claim from a different commentator. These are not the same thing. They are conflating recognized quarterly revenue with run-rate. There is also no disclosure of gross-versus-net treatment. A large share of Anthropic's revenue flows through cloud-provider marketplaces (AWS, GCP). Whether a dollar of customer spend that passes through a reseller is booked gross or net materially changes the headline number, and a leaked deck will not tell you which convention is in use. Without that, "$10.9B" is not a defined quantity. 5. The timing is the tell. These figures surfaced "amidst an ongoing funding round expected to value the startup above OpenAI." The function of leaking flattering forward projections during a raise is to support the price of the equity being sold. It means the disclosure was selected, timed, and framed by a party with a direct financial interest in your believing it. You should apply the same discount you'd apply to any seller's own description of the asset.

kingjdin

I'm sorry but this is complete bullshit. Here's why: 1. Start with where the numbers actually came from. Anthropic did not publish a financial statement. Every outlet is reporting figures that were, in the wording of the coverage, "shared during an ongoing funding round" and "told to investors." That is the single most important fact in the story and the one the headlines bury. You are not looking at a company's reported results. 2. The quarter has not happened. Today is May 21, 2026. The "first profitable quarter" is the June quarter — Q2 2026 — which is not over. The $10.9B revenue figure and the $559M operating profit are forecasts. The verbs in the coverage give it away: "expects to," "is projected to," "is on track to," "is about to." A headline announcing a profitable quarter that has not closed is reporting an intention, not an outcome. You would never let a company you were underwriting book a result you hadn't seen settle; this is the same thing dressed as news. 3. The profit metric is explicitly non-standard, and the non-standardness is favorable by construction. The reported operating profit "includes model training costs but excludes stock-based compensation." For a company like Anthropic, stock-based compensation is one of the largest real economic costs of running the business, and excluding it from "operating profit" is not a conservative or even neutral choice. Whoever defined that metric chose a denominator of costs that produces a positive number. $559M of "profit" on $10.9B of revenue is a \~5% margin; if SBC is anywhere near the scale typical of a frontier lab in an active funding round, that thin margin plausibly inverts to a loss under GAAP. A metric that flips sign depending on which real expense you include is a marketing metric. 4. The "revenue" itself is doing unspecified work. The coverage swings between a $10.9B quarterly figure, a $43-44B annualized run rate, and a separate $30B "annualized revenue" claim from a different commentator. These are not the same thing. They are conflating recognized quarterly revenue with run-rate. There is also no disclosure of gross-versus-net treatment. A large share of Anthropic's revenue flows through cloud-provider marketplaces (AWS, GCP). Whether a dollar of customer spend that passes through a reseller is booked gross or net materially changes the headline number, and a leaked deck will not tell you which convention is in use. Without that, "$10.9B" is not a defined quantity. 5. The timing is the tell. These figures surfaced "amidst an ongoing funding round expected to value the startup above OpenAI." The function of leaking flattering forward projections during a raise is to support the price of the equity being sold. It means the disclosure was selected, timed, and framed by a party with a direct financial interest in your believing it. You should apply the same discount you'd apply to any seller's own description of the asset.

kingjdin

I'm sorry but this is complete bullshit. Here's why: 1. Start with where the numbers actually came from. Anthropic did not publish a financial statement. Every outlet is reporting figures that were, in the wording of the coverage, "shared during an ongoing funding round" and "told to investors." That is the single most important fact in the story and the one the headlines bury. You are not looking at a company's reported results. 2. The quarter has not happened. Today is May 21, 2026. The "first profitable quarter" is the June quarter — Q2 2026 — which is not over. The $10.9B revenue figure and the $559M operating profit are forecasts. The verbs in the coverage give it away: "expects to," "is projected to," "is on track to," "is about to." A headline announcing a profitable quarter that has not closed is reporting an intention, not an outcome. You would never let a company you were underwriting book a result you hadn't seen settle; this is the same thing dressed as news. 3. The profit metric is explicitly non-standard, and the non-standardness is favorable by construction. The reported operating profit "includes model training costs but excludes stock-based compensation." For a company like Anthropic, stock-based compensation is one of the largest real economic costs of running the business, and excluding it from "operating profit" is not a conservative or even neutral choice. Whoever defined that metric chose a denominator of costs that produces a positive number. $559M of "profit" on $10.9B of revenue is a \~5% margin; if SBC is anywhere near the scale typical of a frontier lab in an active funding round, that thin margin plausibly inverts to a loss under GAAP. A metric that flips sign depending on which real expense you include is a marketing metric. 4. The "revenue" itself is doing unspecified work. The coverage swings between a $10.9B quarterly figure, a $43-44B annualized run rate, and a separate $30B "annualized revenue" claim from a different commentator. These are not the same thing. They are conflating recognized quarterly revenue with run-rate. There is also no disclosure of gross-versus-net treatment. A large share of Anthropic's revenue flows through cloud-provider marketplaces (AWS, GCP). Whether a dollar of customer spend that passes through a reseller is booked gross or net materially changes the headline number, and a leaked deck will not tell you which convention is in use. Without that, "$10.9B" is not a defined quantity. 5. The timing is the tell. These figures surfaced "amidst an ongoing funding round expected to value the startup above OpenAI." The function of leaking flattering forward projections during a raise is to support the price of the equity being sold. It means the disclosure was selected, timed, and framed by a party with a direct financial interest in your believing it. You should apply the same discount you'd apply to any seller's own description of the asset.

Ape-With-Darts

Buybacks are. SBC at that level is not.

MyLifeOfficial

Of course I'm oversimplifying, but $60M SBC and $121M buybacks. Basically management is extracting cash from shareholders' wealth.

MelkorKush

What % of cash flow are OpenAi, Anthropic and SpaceX spending on SBC?

89percent

$HGV - What did I miss? Positions: Long HGV On paper, HGV looks like a good business. EBITDA at around 20-25% of market cap, and stock buybacks around 15% of market cap annually. However the stock has been been mostly breakeven ever since IPO. Am I missing something? Is there some accounting twist, like SBC, that breaks it? Is it the acquisitions? Anyone with positions who have opinions?

Rock_or_Rol

Circular financing + not accounting for rapid depreciation + SBC inflation = PE isn’t what it appears

jeebus87

This is the kind of content that actually makes this sub worth reading. The diluted share count filter is key. So many companies announce buybacks while quietly diluting through SBC on the other side. The fact that adding debt control mostly helped identify bad buybacks rather than good ones is a useful insight. Saved.

Aware_Secret_8910

Then it is hard to compare evaluations to the past considering SBC became much bigger in the last decade

Verza_96

Yes, I have my own thesis. I’ve been long $ZETA since the stock was in the $30s, and I’ve continued to average down as the risk/reward became more attractive. For me, the thesis is not based on hype or a short-term trade. It is based on execution. Zeta has now delivered 19 consecutive beat-and-raise quarters, while continuing to grow revenue, expand large customer relationships, and increase customer monetization. What I like is the combination of top-line growth, operating leverage, improving free cash flow, and a clearer path toward GAAP profitability. SBC and dilution are still key items to monitor, but the direction matters: if stock-based compensation keeps becoming less relevant as a percentage of revenue and the company continues to scale profitably, the equity story becomes much cleaner. So my view is simple: $ZETA is still a high-execution story, but if management keeps compounding revenue, expanding enterprise customers, improving margins, and controlling dilution, I believe the market may eventually value it more like a durable AI-driven marketing platform rather than just another small-cap software name.

CannaVestments

A decent start to the year for Curaleaf. On the positive side, the top-line came in well ahead of expectations with 5.7% YoY growth (grew both internationally and domestically) and aEBITDA was modestly ahead of expectations as well. Despite the beat, the aEBITDA margin of 19.6% was their lowest showing going all the way back to 2020 following in Verano's footsteps here suggesting price compression remains ongoing. Cash flow dropped a bit with some accrued expenses paydown although was enough to more than offset $17M in Capex spend as Cura continues to reinvest in the business and sees opportunities ahead. Management was very excited about the opportunities ahead: growth from the federal ban on hemp, potential for banking legislation given ongoing momentum, and the potential to ship cannabis from the US to their international business. Full review: **Revenue:**  QoQ: $333.1M to $324.2 / YoY: $306.6M to $324.2M *Nice beat here on consensus($317M), down sequentially with seasonality but up 5.7% YoY (good to see). Growth on both the domestic and international side YoY, although the international side was down sequentially for the first time. 5 new stores opened during the quarter- 2 in FL, 2 in OH and 1 in Maine.* **Adjusted EBIDTA:**  QoQ: $69.0M to $63.4M / YoY: $66.1M to $63.4M *Down sequentially and YoY but ahead of expectations ($61.4M). Margin drops to 19.6%, down from 20.7% last quarter and 21.6% last year- their lowest margin since 2020.* **Gross Margins:**  QoQ: 48.6% to 48.5% / YoY: 50.7% to 48.5% *Roughly flat sequentially and down a bit YoY- at a good level.* **Operating Expenses:**  QoQ: $158.9 to $156.5M / YoY: $146.2M to $156.5M *Down sequentially- good to see given new store openings although up YoY due to higher SG&A and SBC. Still pretty steep here relative to peers.* **Operational Cash Flow:**  QoQ: $42.3M to $21.0M / YoY: $38.4M to $21.0M *Drop here- although in part due to an outsized account payable paydown in Q1. CapEx was $17.0M in Q1 for FCF of $4.3M- still re-investing a good amount into the business.* **Cash:**  QoQ: $101.6M to $106.1M *Positive OCF somewhat offset by CapEx spend- not much else here. Debt stands at $565M and UTP actually went down quite a bit the the tax provision benefit they took (not sure why) and stands at $439M.*

Rock_or_Rol

We are though.. lol Circular financing, SBC earnings inflation, insane capex on rapidly depreciating assets, a gargantuan portion of the market dedicated to it, insane froth and it’s all based on speculation. What makes it especially bubbly is a massive portion of the buyers operate on a greater fool theory too, “this is not sustainable and it will crash, but will buy it and sell it to someone for a greater price in the meantime.” Bubble doesn’t mean much until the pin prick though… who knows too? Maybe LLMs get a nominal improvement and begin an exponential growth rate again by then.. personally, I don’t think the trillions and trillions of dollars are going to wait around much longer, especially if rates get a nice little hike

Shankur52

Non gaap is more accurate on AMD since Xilinx amortization is still a big paper expense(goodwill). Non gaap does include SBC etc so it's not 100% accurate but closer than gaap p/e atleast.

tokyoduck

The adults have taken over the company and are now in the room. Staff lay offs, reduction in SBC, massive stock buybacks + continuing to grow. This company is only valued at 12 billion. With 4-5 billion in revenue that only puts it at 2.5 sales.

CamxThexMan3

if AI can destory unsophisticated SaaS right now, think five years beyond ... Software margins are likely to continue to contract & stock based compensation (SBC) is a cancer. You just get diluted constantly.

ZarrCon

On a GAAP basis most SaaS names are still quite expensive. If SBC was lower, many might actually be compelling investments right now, even in a case where future cash flows stagnate.

MandingoPants

lol at the atlassian call out. Tell me you don't know jack about stocks without telling me.  "BUT SBC is GAAP!" 

Aware_Secret_8910

Might be good short term but investing long term in a SBC fueled SaaS has too many risks that are not even business related

smelly1ndian

How much was SBC this time 

P_e_n_i_sss

Looks like SBC is coming down a lot too

Rock_or_Rol

Deepseek v4 WW3 possible Possible oil crisis Super El nino potentially forming Insane valuations + circular financing Insane productivity costs on current LLMs SBC earnings inflation < Earnings week!!! Woo!!

Rock_or_Rol

Am I regarded or is the bubble pop like very nearly imminent? Circular financing + SBC earning inflations + unproven hype + depreciating assets + insane valuations A rate spike is what popped the dotcom.. an oil shock = a rate spike.. we are experiencing an oil shock Idk.. I think LLMs will play a large role in the future, but it’ll probably take another few years or a decade.. and trillions of dollars don’t sit around for that long on a maybe

newplayer28

Why would it worth anywhere near a trillion? Get real. They will need to have diverse revenue streams, not just data licensing and ad's. Bull case seems more real anywhere near 100b market cap, after that, it's getting way too expensive because it's just the 2 things I mentioned above and while I know the importance of the above, it's not enough to make it into a half a billion dollar company.. lol. Plus they will keep SBC high because there is no use for all the cash they generate anyways.

Rock_or_Rol

Michael Burry of 'The Big Short' fame is known for predicting the 2007-2008 housing crisis and financial crash. Now, the former hedge fund manager — who's earned a reputation for spotting potential bubbles — argues in a recent Substack that Wall Street has been overstating tech earnings by 42% over the past decade (1). This comes at a time when the AI boom has led to historic highs for tech stocks, which is simultaneously stoking fears of a bursting AI bubble (2). Burry's comments aren't off the cuff. He came to this conclusion after analyzing more than 1,000 annual reports from Nasdaq 100 companies going back 10 years. "Where there is money to be made, there is manipulation," he writes The math behind the claim Burry claims that tech companies have improperly accounted for stock-based compensation (SBC) over the past decade. As a result, investors have been paying inflated prices. Those prices are based on a loose interpretation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which are a standard set of rules used in financial reporting to ensure transparency and consistency. But Burry argues that tech companies are treating SBC as "free" compensation for employees — and not accounting for real costs. As a result, the Nasdaq 100 earnings of primary tech companies are overstated by nearly 20%, he writes, because SBC costs aren't fully factored in. "Of every dollar of earnings per share that GAAP blesses, shareholders see only 83.49 cents of that dollar," he writes. He highlights companies like Meta, which he says overstated owner earnings by about 20%. Other companies he points to include Datadog, Workday, Axon, Shopify, Palantir, Marvell, CrowdStrike and Zscaler. Burry writes that Tesla's use of SBC was so significant, the GAAP overstatement was reduced from about 20% to 12.5% simply by removing Tesla from his analysis. During the past decade (ending in fiscal 2025), 97 tech companies in the Nasdaq 100 reported $4.9 trillion in cumulative CAAP net income, according to Burry. But Wall Street analysts include SBC in their analysis, bumping that number up to $5.8 trillion. That, says Burry, leaves an "earnings illusion" of $1.7 trillion. "Wall Street over the last 10 years guided investors to 42% more earnings than ever actually existed," he writes. Burry has previously warned that AI hyperscalers are artificially boosting their earnings by understating the depreciation of their assets (3). Broader implications for investors The practice of improperly accounting for SBC "skews valuation metrics, making companies appear more valuable than they truly are," according to American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, per FTI Consulting. "Analysts and investors often accept these adjusted figures without question, leading to inflated market perceptions (4)." Unless investors push back, then "widespread reliance on adjusted EBITDA as a performance measure will continue distorting financial evaluations and misleading stakeholders (4)." Many Americans own stocks through 401(k) plans or index funds, which are increasingly concentrated in major tech companies. So they could face significant losses if valuations were to normalize. Out of 2,013 U.S. stock funds (excluding sector funds) screened in Morningstar Direct, an investment analysis platform, Morningstar found that 119 of those "had 50% or more of their assets in tech, while 298 had a 40% or higher allocation (5)." And those numbers are understated, since some investors categorize tech stocks under different sectors — such as categorizing Meta and Alphabet under the communications services sector (5). That means 401(k)s and index funds that are heavily concentrated in tech stocks are more vulnerable to market volatility — and, potentially, overvalued assets. For retirees and near-retirees, this poses a conundrum. With the rising cost of living (6) — including rising healthcare costs — retirees and near-retirees want their investments to beat inflation. Yet, there are growing fears of an AI bubble — and now, with Burry's analysis, there's a new concern to add to the mix. Most financial professionals recommend a diversified approach to manage risk and reduce volatility. That means spreading investments across different asset classes, sectors and geographies for more consistent long-term returns. Investors need growth and risk protection. And that's shifting the investor mindset, Mike Loukas, CEO of TrueMark Investments, told CNBC's ETF Edge. Nowadays, many retirees are looking for "performance that's good enough" rather than trying to beat the S&P 500 (7).

Deviilsadvocate7

The point I believe is that the cost of those shares is being reported at CURRENT prices when granted to employees but the ACTUAL cost by the time they vest years later is often much higher than what was initially accounted for as the value of those shares has likely gone up over time. So the cost of SBC may be far higher than initially reported if I’m understanding correctly.

bananastock

Not really and they usually specify it's to offset SBC