Reddit Posts
Daily Crypto Discussion - August 5, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - August 4, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - August 3, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - August 2, 2026 (GMT+0)
With the CC issues, anyone able to offer explanation on how the large exchanges like CoinBase or River hold their BTC?
Ongoing ColdCard Q Viability With v1.5.0Q and later?
The Coldcard case fundamentally challenges the future of Bitcoin
Attempting to remove OSS licenses is why coldcard firmware became vulnerable
Daily Crypto Discussion - August 1, 2026 (GMT+0)
Latest CC update even self generated seeds now seem to be at risk
Which HW wallets have native dice roll support for seed generation?
Question about the safety of using ColdCard air-gapped
Coldcard multi-sig wallets that have never spent.
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 31, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 30, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 29, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 28, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 27, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 26, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 25, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 24, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 20, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 19, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 18, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 17, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 16, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 15, 2026 (GMT+0)
Every Free Sat I’ve ever “earned” through ZBD and CC Rewards.
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 14, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 13, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 12, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 11, 2026 (GMT+0)
How does one locked on Canton?
How do I lock CC on Canton Network?
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 10, 2026 (GMT+0)
"I built a free crypto dashboard with DCA calc, position size calc, AI analyst and live heatmap — feedback welcome"
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 9, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 8, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 7, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 6, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 5, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 4, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - July 3, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 29, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 28, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 27, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 26, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 25, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 24, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 23, 2026 (GMT+0)
Blockchain.com hides my BTC on a legacy wallet – funds visible on-chain but not spendable
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 22, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 17, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 16, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 15, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 14, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 13, 2026 (GMT+0)
It's incorrect to compare Bitcoin's "confirmation" with the banking system's "pre-auth"
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 12, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 11, 2026 (GMT+0)
How much Bitcoin is actually at quantum risk? We measured it. Here is the honest version.
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 10, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 9, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 8, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 7, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 6, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 5, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 4, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 3, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 2, 2026 (GMT+0)
The New Financial System that nobody saw... And Canton
Daily Crypto Discussion - June 1, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 31, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 30, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 29, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 28, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 27, 2026 (GMT+0)
I lost $10,000 of my mother’s savings in crypto and I do not know how to live with myself
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 26, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 25, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 24, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 23, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 22, 2026 (GMT+0)
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 21, 2026 (GMT+0)
Binance froze my 1200 USDT due to the Travel Rule. After two weeks of empty promises, support just stated they have "no timeframe" for a resolution.
Daily Crypto Discussion - May 20, 2026 (GMT+0)
Mentions
There is no who is who on the blockchain. It's educated guesses and assertions. Some are better than others at attributing ownership. For alleged CC transfers there are a few trackers like https://coldcard-hack-tracker.vercel.app/
Yeah and not just MK3. I don't know why the put MK3 in the title, instead of also putting MK4 and Q. It is a common bug in them. I agree that people did not understand that happened because they think everyone with CC is impacted and people who followed the paranoid guide are not impacted by this issue because they never used CC RNG.
Mostly because AI plausibly likely to find something like this wasn't available to consumers until about 3yrs ago, and by then this was already 'old' code. It wouldn't have taken an AI to find this originally though; some basic well-designed tests or review procedures would've caught it. CC didn't have any of those.
>They do this by identifying victims, then offering their services for a fee, then another fee, then another fee... And/or simply getting victims to supply enough identification info in order to carry out identity theft and get CC/loans in their name.
Not likely, but not impossible, as this CC example shows, insider threat much more dangerous. Bitcoin is supposed to be trustless by design but that is proving to be more difficult in practice.
Most CC customers didn't lose their Bitcoin.
I don't have KP3 I only used CC MK4. But I recently learned that the method to convert 100+ numbers into a seed phrase is share among different wallets and tools. And I think one of them is the one you mention. Coldcard has this in some python script rolls.py in their paranoid guide.
I bought a new CC about 2 years ago. Set up the seed phrase but still haven't moved my btc to it. Holy shit, this must have been an omen. I'd rather be out $150 for a wallet.
I’ve been in btc for nearly 12 years now. I agree with you, but that was more of an issue from 2010-2016. From 2014-2024, it’s absolutely been led by exchange hacks, which carries more weight given the value increase. If you lost 1,500 btc in 2013, it would suck, but you’re talking the value of a nice suburban home. Last couple years, hasn’t been much of an issue on either side. It sucks the CC “hack attack” occurred, but we’re talking 1,500 btc. Borderline nothing burger in terms of quantity across history.
"Do everything right and it didn't work" But thats just not true. You trusted cold card's RNG which was a single point of fatal failure. They only had one RNG chip. Some HW wallets have multiple HW RNGs, cold card had only one. If you trusted it to generate you a good seed, well, you misplaced your trust. This is why they gave you the option to roll dice for your seed so YOU could trust your own process and not put blind trust in a chip People do not realize being your own bank comes with a ton of responsibility and they trusted CC when they didnt have to.
The hack is based on the CC UUID so a physical CC should be sufficient to prove ownership of the derived seed.
No, it demonstrates a basic understanding of bitcoin and probability. You're CC is perfectly safe to use.
Personally, I have a 100-die seed on a CC and no plans to change my setup as of now, because I have verified (within reason) that the dice hashing function of the CC has always worked as intended, by reading others' analysis since the incident and even prompting AI to explain to me the section of code that hashes the rolls. Everyone is reacting emotionally right now. All their advice comes from anger and disgust, which is understandable. CoinKite deserves the hate, and I don't actually trust the developers. But their code can be analyzed, and unlike before, it's actually being analyzed and critiqued in depth. I'm going to keep up on the news and expert code reviews and only make a change if I have some concrete reason to doubt my setup. As for other options, if I were looking for a new wallet, my first pick would be Trezor Safe 7, my second would be Bitbox02. Either way, I'd generate my seed words with dice. Bitbox has some nice printable sheets on how to do this.
CC does have a TRNG. They ineptly disabled it in the firmware (when they moved away from it being true open source) and it then reverted to a low entropy version which then made users' private keys hackable. Most of the others are true open source, which incentivises more people to use and scrutinise the code. Many more people are now scrutinising their code (some using AI) and they've yet to find another with such a catastrophic bug. In any case, at the very least, I suggest adding a strong passphrase if you haven't already.
CC has a TRNG, but the firmware did not call upon it when it said it did.
I’ll keep it and use it exclusively as a dice roll and signing device for multisig. Nothing else. As long as the seeds are good (dice roll function still works properly on CC) there is no need to throw it away right now. If (when) Coinkite goes bust, support stops, always easy to switch one multisig key. But after this I will go back to multisig for sure. I feel like an idiot being influenced by podcasters and YouTubers when nobody actually took a good look. It’s a wake up call for me.
No need to rush it; wait for the dust to settle. I’ll want to upgrade at some point. CC is probably the most scrutinized cold storage product at the moment.
what you described is a white hat hacker's daily job; finding vulnerabilities before the bad guy does and returning the loot. For your question, it would truly be a nightmare to distinguish between real CC holder and fake CC holder. Who will be the entity that make the judgment? How will it be fair & auditable? If I'm a nefarious actor, I could steal the seed of an affected victim, claim those are my own to get the refund. Who will be the mediator to prove that?
I put $20 back in my CC to see if it gets swiped in the future.
No you didn't. Two days ago you said you got 3.5btc drained from your CC.
This is so cool, very cypherpunk, I love it. I don’t own a N64 but I saw a similar project for GBA and BTC so I might as well try that one. One thing worth nothing is, the novelty here is the device used to generate which was built on the pre iot era, giving it the same level of isolation than the ones of devices that were designed today **with that objective in mind.** Same security vulnerabilities could be found here as the CC wallet because that depends on the RNG algorithm they decide to use, I assume controller input, sensors which should be validated are still working properly before using them as entropy source, PRNG etc. The key here is scrutiny, which is something CCW didn’t had until bad actors took a look. But this is the monero community after all, so this is in good hands. Thanks for sharing!
Probably nothing? The event would be recorded on a public blockchain, which would put a damper on any logic to blacklist an address from the CC vulnerability. There is likely more than one person/group mining these mountains now. I don't even like using the word 'hacker' in this case. It grants cover to the responsible party, Coinkite. As if some ultra-nefarious shadow figure omega-brained this heist, when in reality, coinkite was selling locks with guessable keys.
You can't, you have to trust the RNG which seems bullet proof. This is the reason I chose CC, for the dice function. Considering the recent RNG issue on CC, the dice function remains safe. It has given me some anxiety even though the the maths and logic say its safe.
How do you do that with a trezor, for example? It doesn't have a dice roll function like CC
Grab 100 individual physical dice, put them in a jar, shake it up and dump it on a tiled floor. Lots of bouncing, colliding spinning, random chaos. Write each dice face value down on paper in a random fashion ie don't pick all the 1's then 2's. Just write it down as you go. Enter those values into the dice roll function and you seedphrase is created from that entropy. How secure is that ? Imagine how long it would take for someone to throw 100 dice on the floor and have them land in exactly the same way as you did with the same exact values you had, not only that, they then have to pick the individual values of each dice face in the exact same order as you did to arrive at your seed. Astronomical odds, like finding a specific atom in 200 billion galaxies. This is why the seed function save CC user and why everyone should use it.
CC4 here. had it a few years now. Generated my seed using 100 dice rolls for entropy. Funds safe & moved to Sparrow... sorry for your loss if they got to your stack.
after what happened i moved my funds from CC Q to ledger nano X, I'm waiting for the Trezor Safe 5, I move all my funds there , I will use The Diceware Passphrase [https://theworld.com/\~reinhold/diceware.html](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html) to generate my long passphrase (if Trezor allows to insert spaces when creating the passphrase, Ledger doesn't allow it), for now I don't want the multi sig, maybe in the future . If anyone has a better strategy, please let me know.
This is one thing I didn’t understand- the offending line was publicly viewable? Or it was behind CC’s unviewable rng function, basically?
That's how Ian Coleman's tool works. You need to take your dice rolls and enter them into the website. That is how you validate what the ColdCard providing is correct. With Ian Coleman's tool, you click the checkbox for "Show entropy details" and then paste in your dice rolls into the field. It will then provide you back the seed phrase that you need to validate what the CC wallet provided you. Or you can follow CoinKite's own instructions on validating this process which involves using their Python scripts and again inputting every dice roll result as an argument for the script. https://coldcard.com/docs/verifying-dice-roll-math/ I don't have a beef with anyone. Any one is free to read my comments and see that I'm simply laying out the proper instructions that need to be followed in order to trustlessly generate your own seed phrase.
The ColdCard was aimed at advanced users. They would be expected to at least use a passphrase. Even if the CC had no faulty code there's always a small chance someone could find your physical seed backup.
You are way too vague. When you criticize a group, you can't just use a label without giving concrete examples or description of the group. I have no idea who you are or what you work on, so I don't know who's been toxic to you, and for what. Being toxic and a bitcoiner, does not make you a Toxic Maximalism. Whenever I hear about Toxic Maximalism, it's about being toxic to scammers and grifters. If you don't agree, then describe the group. If you feel attacked, then we need to know if you are a scammer or a grifter, or if you are just talking about people who are toxic in general. If you think it failed because of the CC exploit, then please elaborate.
Can I generate a seed on Bitbox trustlessly, like I can on my CC Q? Can I roll dice or some other method of adding entropy that is easily accessible, and verify that the code on my device reproduces same seed from same inputs?
The obvious answer to me has always been a multi vendor multi sig. I had the same concerns as you, and found that I could not find a way to mitigate the risks. With multi vendor, you don't rely on a single vendor, so an exploit like the CC one we've just had would be mitigated. It could also mitigate more advanced exploits that are more theoretical that involves a man in the middle where the transaction is changed under transferal from the wallet to the device. Multi-sig minimized single point of failure. If one key is lost, you just move your funds with the remaining 2. break-in -> They can't use the seed as they have 1-of-3 keys. You can still recover your funds, even if they steal your seed from the house, as you have 2 of the remaining 3 seeds. fire -> steel plate passphrase -> Never been a big fan, but haven't used singe-sig in ages, I lack a lot of knowledge here. If it's too simple, it can be trivial to break, if it's too complex, you have to back it up, and now you just have a dumb 2-of-2 like multi-sig, where either part can lose you your bitcoin. Having something simple to allow for a decoy wallet does sound great, and even a simple passphrase would have bought you time with the CC exploit, but I think it's a better recommendation going forward to roll your own seed or add entropy through a device with dice or similar if it can be verified. Passphrases are not really needed for multi-sig, but it is possible. At it's core, I think the goal should be to minimize single point of failures. I understand that multi-sig is more advanced, and might not be for everyone. I also think this is way overblown and end up just scaring more people away. It's well worth the time investment if you are securing a significant (to you) amount of bitcoin. Yes, you need to back up all 3 keys public keys as well. This is super easy, pitfall is not knowing. Read a setup guide and thoroughly test your setup before sending all your bitcoin to it. This includes wiping all devices and software wallets used, followed by recovery and test transactions.
You're acting like I'm not understanding you, but contorting the conversation to intentionally remove CC Q from the process, when using that device specifically is what makes it convenient. I don't need to use Ian Coleman's site offline to test that CC is not spoofing the seed generation, because CC doesn't know it's a test. I can use Coin Kite's code trustlessly because of this orthogonality. I don't have to read the code. I don't have to generate the seed outside my Cold Card and then import it to my HWW. You are engaged in motivated reasoning in order to demonize Coin Kite alon behalf of the poor unfortunate victims that invested their life savings in self-custody without learning basic details of what they were buying. The same bug could be introduced by another HWW, but in that case the HWW would not CONVENIENTLY allow me to generate my seed deterministically and trustlessly, unless you show me one. I'll be delighted to discover this feature exists elsewhere.
That's crazy. Can't you import the seed from the bricked CC to a new CC and then use the new CC to sign the transaction to at least help you move the funds? I had a similar set up with Casa but i had a coldcard Q instead but I didn't update the firmware with the latest patch Coinkite created out of fear that it may actually brick the device and I was fortunate that it worked for me. Keep me updated, hopefully it all works out for you.
exactly, this idea is knew jerk reaction, by the same kind of fake security 'experts' that recommended cold card, because of all the bullshit they added. Its so obvious, that CC was more focused on security theatre than building a simple security model that is secure for everyone. now the same arrogant 'experts' are parroting stupid catch phrases like you cant trust hardware entropy. People are going get compromised by running seed gen with the assistance of a general purpose computer. Its noobs that will fall for it, because anyone with common sense will see why this process is just security theatre targeting people who are scared. imo r/bitcoin mods really need to ban people spreading crap ways to generate seeds it is far worse than promoting shitcoins and alts
This might be cover from Ledger. The situation can be a person migrating weak CC keys directly to a Ledger device, without generating new keys. Next thing you know everything blows up on Ledger for the same people losing their stash.
Pretty simple. Full space is 2\^128, CC space was 2\^40. So the chance of you address randomly in that full space also being in the CC space, is 1 in 2\^88. That not about twice less likely, if the full space 2\^41, then it would be twice less likely. 2650 would be a thousand times less likely. 1 in 2\^88 is one in a hundred million trillion trillion.
How is this new? My CC secured are safe for a life time. 1. Dice roll (check your CC generated test-seed against Ian Coleman's website, same dice rolls should produce same 24 words, if your CC is not spoofing the 24 words then you cans safely generate your real seed). 2. Add a passphrase, use a strong password generator that has no relation to Bitcoin 3. Tamper-proof, durable, and legible, written multiple times in same source if possible 4. Geographically distributed 5. Recognition-over-recall - you need to assume that you have early-onset dementia and that recovering your seed to passing to a trusted relative or friend is trivial. The necessary instructions should be on the combination of your geographically distributed seed.
If you have a CC... Just be completely sure that you used the manual dice roll method. If you are paranoid and you still do not trust that the CC will correctly convert 100+ numbers into the right seed (and not a pre-made seed or something like that). Well in that case you can run the same numbers with that [rolls.py](http://rolls.py) which is supposed to be a simple script and used by the CC wallet. Of course, by doing this, you will expose your seed to a new device (the device running the live linux OS). But this should be extremely low risk if it is done by an experience person, with no internet, no bt, fully formatting the live linux usb, etc. At least you will sleep knowing MK4 converted 100 manual rolls to a seed using a std approach. I THINK if you put the same 100+ numbers into other methods (**SeedSigner**, **Sparrow Wallet's dice input**, and **Ian Coleman's BIP39 tool in Coldcard mode)** you will get the exact same seed phrase. I quickly asked the AI and they all seem to be using the same code to convert random numbers into a seed phrase.
Indeed, that's why you test your HWW against another source to make sure it's not spoofing you. You can do this with Ian Coleman's website. CC was not spoofing, so my coin is safe. Thank you Coin Kite, for giving me the tools to verify that my seed is truly random. The more important code is in the mobile app that creates the transaction, not the HWW.
Yes, and if I can verify that the core functionality is working without reviewing code or trusting developers then that's the HWW for me. I can say that about CC, not any others that I know of, certainly not when I was in the market. My hardware device performed exactly as required, giving me the tools to protect my coin from the malice or incompetence of the developers behind it. I guess if you don't know how to use bitcoin you can go for the service that requires you to trust third parties, but they why not just go back to fiat land? And don't give me some bullshit about it being too complicated. This is basic shit that anyone investing their life savings should have learned, is literally everywhere online.
This isnt good advice, and would have prevented the CC exploit.
Let's put your seed into a website using a general purpose computer! And continue to use a security theatre HW like CC I am sure this much safer than letting a secure environment generate a seed safety then writing it down on paper /s
Ah yes trust CC the company that created this whole situation and some random website. This totally safer than letting a secure environment generate the secret /s
Not a black swan event. Mt Gox was the first. No reason to assume the CC debacle wasn't sabotage when viewed objectively. Many, many more attacks coming.
You can do it when CC and Ian Coleman's site. No brute forcing required.
Dice rolls are deterministic. If I use Ian Coleman's site or BlueWallet I can verify that ColdCard is using my dice rolls for entropy. I don't have to do that for my actual seed, it's not going to use my dice rolls for all of my tests and then suddenly stop, because it cannot tell which seed it a test and which is the real deal. You're overcomplicating everything. CC allows me to add my entropy and I can verify that it is using it trivially, add I can add a passphrase. Send me the link to another HWW that provided that feature between 2019 and 2025.
It is. It’s one of the selling points of CC actually (to me at least). Seedsigners do also support the same dice rolling function but it’s slightly more restrictive: you throw a dice 50 time or 99 times (IIRC) but not more. On a CC you can throw a lot more than 100 times (I actually did it 250 times, but theoretically it’s no better than 99 times) and it would hash the entire string into a 256 bit seed and map out the words for you. This one function is not compromised on a CC. And it does what it promised to do and the results correspond to the open source python script, so that gives me a bit of peace of mind these past few days. I’m still planing to move on to other wallets though. It’s such a disaster I feel so bad for the people who lost their coins. I could have been one of them.
I don’t think CC matters for price movement. BTC is already an institutional asset. People with money don’t even think about thinking about self custody. It’s not a thesis killer for them. It might be a little for our community, but I still think it’s not “dead”…it just strengthens from now on in my opinion.
If the guy in the screenshot tells the truth then it's definitely bad handling of the issue on CoinKite's part, and is even a bit suspicious. But it's a MK4 which to my understanding still has low entropy but not quite low enough for a reasonable bruteforce attack and to my knowledge wasn't yet affected in the current attack. If we assume all the reported cases of funds drained from CC wallets and CK not responding/blocking are them utilizing a backdoor, that means that likely they have another backdoor on the mk4 and also that their strategy was to only drain wallets sporadically and pray no one realizes, until they suddenly switched to a big drain strategy but now only on mk3. Or maybe someone else did find the mk3 backdoor now? So it was an "inside job" in the past but now it's an "outside job"? It could be, but I feel like all these theories assume a lot more dedication to plausible deniability than most criminals give, when simply covering their tracks is often simpler and more effective (why not place the backdoor in the proprietary "secure element"?). I saw too many cases of things like these happening out of negligence to not assume it's the case here too. If there will be more direct evidence of maliciousness it can change my mind but for now I still tend to assume negligence.
In hintsight, coldcard seems to be the perfect scam. They trashed on ledger, run marketing with the help of influencers praising coldcard. A lot of people seap over to CC because they ran ledgers name trough the dirt. Eventho there never was any evidence your coins are not safe with ledger people believed the lies. Now the most best praised cold wallet is compromised. This is just to much to be a coincidence. I bet my liver, this was planned inside job. Get people to use your product then go backstep them when they think they are safe. Everyone at coldcard should be investigated.
If you had told me in advance the CC hack would happen, I would have guessed a week long drawdown to $50k. Instead, crickets, in terms of price. So my conclusion is..... the VAST majority of owners do not use any self custody and have ZERO interest in ever using it, therefore for most, this was a meaningless problem for those crazy people who think the government is out to confiscate their money at every turn. This is not my view, but I suspect it is the view of a much larger majority of Bitcoin holders than I originally thought.
That’s called “memorization”, and for something as specific as this it is actually a near zero chance of extraction, though not exactly zero. It’s a lot of moving parts, and the attacks especially on early models looked at fixed shapes: API keys, CC numbers, etc that may have been part of the training data. This kind of bug wouldn’t be found by extraction, that said there is something more subtle at work here: the fact the model is even able to spot an issue like this is because there is a massive corpus of code in their training data, enough that the consequences of that specific code can be inferred with high accuracy. In other words, similar class of bugs probably exist in the training data. But LLMs are black boxes honestly, the concept of emergence especially in thinking models is quite literally a field of research rn. In any case, you can just opt out of having your data used for training. And with a big initial investment you could run Kimi K3 or GLM5.2 locally and still get there, one of the posts I mentioned used glm. What I can assure you: whether it’s cloud models with safety guardrails or self hosted frontier models, people are actively racing to find as many exploits as they can, while others are trying to preemptively close this exploits. It’s about to get really fucking wild. And yes, someone could’ve found this without AI, and I actually do believe at least someone did and actively exploited this a few times. But the issue is that the barrier to accomplish this sort of thing has been lowered considerably.
To think other HW wallets might make the same mistake as CC by not turning on their TRNG means you think it is an easy mistake to make, and that means you do not understand the level of incompetence it took for CC to make this mistake.
I agree with you. I won't ever recommend CC again. I won't every buy from Coinkite again. I will keep using my existing CC(s) because I can trust my high entropy PP and 100+ dice rolls. I will however be moving to multi-sig ASAP.
Ok that would be an exception, but I’d still want to generate a new seed just to be safe, if the memory of creating a new wallet vs restoring the previous CC one is in *any way* fuzzy.
>Anyone who ever had a ColdCard at any point should generate a new wallet/seed, no matter what they are using now. Why? You mean even if someone already is using different seed than CC made?
No. There's two things: - the secure element with the ability to provide true randomness - *calling the flipping thing that has the ability to provide true randomness* From the article: > On closed source, honestly. This part of Ledger OS is closed source. Access to this Secure Element technology comes with a hard vendor requirement that the low-level implementation stays closed. We love open source, but between the highest level of certified security and open source philosophy for this specific layer, we chose security, and I still think that was the right call. AKA, "TrustMeBro, we're using the secure element (TRNG), not a different lib or the overall microprocessor PRNG." /s, but for real, this is obscuring the exact thing someone would check to make sure Ledger isn't accidentally doing what CC did. Cryptography is math that only works in the forward direction. Open sourcing your cryptography implementation code has *no downsides*. Just replace what's said above with this: "Our calculator is extra secure because we won't share how we multiply numbers; it's just not worth the risk leaking our proprietary methods." If you think showing *how* you compute seeds or *how* you store secrets in the secure chip means someone can use this to hack or extract them, crypto really is dead.
So suppose this is (or starts out as) legitimate. And suppose some of the whitehat-collected funds are a) unclaimed (not everyone reads Reddit incessantly), and/or b) claimed but legitimately have already destroyed or have no access to the CC (after all, you just needed your private key/words for access, not the actual device). So then … what does the whitehat do with those unclaimed/unclaimable funds? Donate to their whitehat cause? Is that cause then still whitehat?
He's asking people who's been affected by the exploit to not destroy their CC's. A white hat hacker would still steal your coins, with the intent to give it back if you if you can prove ownership.
Counting and writing down numbers is complicated? I'm not sure you should be allowed use your own money, let alone Bitcoin. Regular bank app security is now complicated than setting up a secure seed on CC.
They should have qualified their recommendations. Cold cards were always only for people with a basic understanding of Bitcoin and private key security. I love how their features allowed my bitcoin security to be immune from their shitty software development processes. Can't say that about any other HWW that I know of, and that's basically a read line for me. I need to be able to add my own entropy, that's why I bought CC.
That's incredibly inconvenient if you think about it for 5 seconds. Unless you have another device that is not internet enabled that does the same thing as CC..?
I'm glad they had a feature that allowed me to set my own entropy then. Beyond that, unless they added some surveillance system capable of connecting with the internet, and I manually check my send and change addresses, I don't really have to trust their competence as software developers. I have complete confidence in my CC Q, as the more important code is in the mobile apps used to create the transactions, that the Q just needs to sign.
I'm probably alone (and on CC but nothing lost, thanks to His Noodly Appendages) and i'm looking for them to lower their prices for an MK5...
Definitely, I'm sticking with CC, this was user error.
Yeah fair enough - the pass phrase certainly helps as it adds entropy but to your point I am blind trusting that Blockstream generated my mnemonic accurately just like the CC folks trusted CC to be doing that accurately…..guess I’ll get to rolling
They lost their bitcoin. As a cold card customer I lost nothing. How do you explain that? Luck? These larpers with diamond hands need to learn basic facts about bitcoin before blaming anyone else for their misfortune. I bought the CC because it allowed me to roll dice, and therefore I didn't have to trust the HWW provider. Why didn't they use that feature to secure their life savings? Did nobody ever tell them to verify, don't trust?
There's an advanced option on Casa where you import the seed from the CC to YubiKey however you will need to have another hardware wallet ready to replace that YubiKey immediately and create a new key-set. I would say don't panic because you're still using a multi-sig that only one signer is a CC. Order another hardware wallet and once that arrives, you can do that advanced option process.
>Tbh providing your own enthropy is a security theatre feature that most reputable HW dont support With the CC you could add entropy with dicerolls. I don't think that it was theatre as it saved the people who used it. I was not referring to OP's link.
I'm an idiot, and my bitcoin in cold storage using CC Q is way safer than yours.
The problem is that he/she has a multi-sig that has a CC as one of the signers and that CC bricked therefore making it impossible for him/her to move any funds to any other wallet.
I didn't have to know this detail because I used dice roll and passphrase. It's important to understand what level of complexity you have to verify to be secure. Learning to code isn't the same as securing your bitcoin. Some bitcoin core developers have lost a lot of bitcoin and they could read all of the code they're setup was based upon. The verification I had to do was available to any pleb, any idiot could have rolled dice and verified that the CC HWW was not giving it bad seeds by checking that the seed produced by another source for the same dice rolls was identical.
Did you run the new patch that Coinkite pushed out and is that was caused the CC to brick?
The moment you put your seed in a software wallet then it will become a hot wallet and it's a dangerous game. Tbh I don't even know how that would help you with the multi-sig tx with casa because casa needs to make sure it is the keys from the CC that is signing the transaction. Is your multi-sig set up comprised of all CC HWs?
Im using CC - generate seed with TRNG after the update to v5.6.0 - I have checked the code myself - now it is safe.
Updating my previous response now that I watched the video gist. I agree, it seems like using dice rolls shifts the mode entirely, so rolling one is basically horrible. And agree, this is totally a separate thing (user error, not hardware issues). Might as well make a video about using "password123," that certain computers/sites allow you to do this, and that those accounts have been hacked. Huge surprise. I see this guy as just raising awareness on a proper setup/user misunderstood, not a prescient insight on any RNG weakness. Does seem like if changing to dice method means CC was not automatically supplementing RNG entropy on top... wow, they let users move on from *one* dice roll? I don't think a warning is at all sufficient there, don't even allow it?!
He explained more about it in a post yesterday or the day before. Very similar situation. He was disparaged in all the subs and ignored by CC. Even got blocked. He got wiped out in 2022.
Anyone suggesting just using exchanges can go fuck themselves. Unless its a temporary solution to this CC issue. If bitcoins are held by custodians then it dead on arrival and we can just wrap it up.
Its not what people want to hear because emotions and anger are high but CC are safe to use on the new firmware especially with 100+ dice roll. The error has been found and the bug fixed. The device is secure with dice roll but trust has been destroyed. People will still use them with dice rolls
I certainly have no idea but someone on here posted about it and said CC ignored him and actually blocked him on certain sites. There was a whole thread.
I have sympathy because they lost life savings and entire net worth doing what they were told was correct. I am a coldcard user and the dice roll function was appealing to me. I got the CC because of that and used it, I am safe from hacks but it was scary. I cannot imagine what people who lost everything are going through. I have much sympathy for them. Its not their faults.
This is why I like the CC dice function. Trezor should do it as well
Link to what you found in 5min of research years ago showing suspicion about CC entropy, please.
Multi vender multi-sig. Same as before, but without CC's being involved.
If a weak CC seed is found to have 0 BTC but has movements in the past, crackers will definitely try some easy wordlist passphrases.
> We are talking about the Coldcard issue here. Topic is "Securing your Bitcoin", not "Ussing your cold card correctly", and pic doesn't reference CC either.
Ledger used a $200k+ laser to extract the keys off of a CC secure element in 2020. Clearly some researchers cared.
It just offered a lot of features. I'm looking for a new HW, and the flagship from Trezor is 250 euro and can not be used air gapped, and does not have a dice roll feature. It's also unclear to me how you sign a transaction without any software. Is it even possible? With the CC, all you had to do is move a file (PSBT) between the computer and the device to sign. Pretty simple concept, i really liked it. Pretty sure you could also just plug in into the computer and sign it that way.
If you don't want to trust a device to create your seed, you can create it yourself, or add entropy through dice rolls. The reason you can add dice rolls through the CC is literally so you don't have to trust them.
I had not heard about the BTC Heist until j just the other day becayse i have not been around my computer as of late, but wheb i was reading another subreddit post and replies someone said something like how CC did not have the money to pay everyone back so it made me think that if there company was not worth 100 million or something like that so i thought to myself well shit i bet the owner split after finding out about the vulnerabilities and either hacking it himself or finding someone else to do it for him but then he got burned because the hacker he thought he could trust thought to himself well what's better that 50 million?? 100 million and no strings so i really do think it was an inside job honestly it just sounds from the way people have been talking about it all over the place like the it was an inside job. I am completely with you on that train of thought.
I bought IB1T today, was holding my stash on Jade. Will take a hit on taxes, but I will know my BTC is secure. Yearly tax fillings and inheritance will be super easy. TER is a bitch, but well worth for the piece of mind. I cannot afford my +1 BTC to be stolen, it took me 5 years to accumulate in a terrible job in a god-forsaken EU country. I know Jade is safe, code is open source etc but I am not tech savvy, there could be a problem (as CC) that I would understand nothing.
>As tech-savvy individuals, we need to be self-critical enough to admit that self-custody isn’t for the average person who works hard for their money and simply wants to protect the value of their savings. This is literally the opposite from advice people would have given last week. That this is now being rattled around as "obvious" advice only after CC is so fucking dishonest.
>It's not a self custody hack! Its ONE service/manufacturer who through its incompetence, added to malicious intent of other party, fucked over a lot of people. This is no different than a bank telling customers their money is safe in their vault and then get robbed like in the movies. The difference is that customers get their money back even if the bank was robbed. The CC victims won't.
But there must have been a few researchers using CC for storing their bitcoin?? It was THE premium, top of the line secure cold wallet! Is it possible noone checked, even for their own safety dammit
Thank you for the quick reply! This makes perfect sense... But is also a huge warning for our community in the future, that we cant apriori trust an opensource project... Im just sad, given how big of a product Coldcard was, that noone took the time to check this stuff, if only for their own protection if they used CC...
I’ve done some research on the situation (which is CC is being 2 keys of a 3). According to AI and a Nostr post, it’s possible to steal coins during a transaction because all public keys of an address are broadcasted to the network. To avoid this, you should send the transaction “privately” to a miner and mine it.