PIN

Euphoric-Pop9717

💯— Bitcoin = 12-24 seed phrase - plus other ways to secure it vs. Bank = 4 digit PIN code + constant hackers and security breaches but your banker will say “trust me bro your money is fdic insured.” Meanwhile banks hold fractional reserves.

SquashDaddy331

My favorite is when people say quantum computing will crack bitcoin. But don’t mention the fear of it cracking their 4 digit ATM PIN code

LibertyWithLiquidity

Legend. If you currently use a software wallet, that is okay, but make sure to purchase a hardware wallet soon (this is a large amount of Bitcoin). I recommend the BitBox02. Get the Nova if you want to use it with iOS, for Windows the regular BitBox02 is enough. Buy it directly from bitbox.swiss, not Amazon or another seller. Generate a fresh 12 word seed phrase with that hardware wallet, write down the words with a pencil (more durable than a pen) & store it in a safe location. Those 12 words are your Bitcoin essentially, NO ONE should ever get them, otherwise your Bitcoin WILL be gone in no time. Anyone who asks for those words is a scammer, no exceptions. Not the police, not tech support, no one. The hardware wallet itself is not critical, as it's secured by a PIN you choose when you set it up. After 10 unsuccessful attempts it will factory reset & wipe out the keys stored inside the wallet. So you can pretty much keep that thing in your desk drawer.

frugaleringenieur

Ah, you mean the mobile app or the desktop app? I had troubles around the oracle+PIN which is a PITA especially if at any point Blockstream server goes bust.

sweetntenderhooligan

I suppose the stage where it is supposed to show the correct BTC balance instead of 0 in the Blockstream app? After entering the PIN to unlock the Blockstream jade, and using the Blockstream app on my phone in conjunction with the jade plus to access the wallet using QR codes, the wallet that was generated on my phone said 0 BTC, and I tried it over and over again. I was using it in watch-only mode.

Equivalent_Ranger753

This is an AI generated response from Brave’s Leo. Sorry if any of this is redundant Recovering Bitcoin from old Android phones without a PIN, password, or seed phrase is extremely difficult and often impossible, especially if the device cannot be accessed or rooted safely. Since Schildbach Bitcoin Wallet (now known as Bitcoin Wallet) stored private keys locally on the device, your only chance lies in successfully extracting the wallet data file (wallet.protobuff or similar) from the phone’s internal storage without wiping it. Step-by-step instructions Prerequisites The original Android phone(s) with the wallet still intact. A computer (preferably running an older OS like Windows 7 or Linux, due to driver compatibility). USB debugging enabled (if previously activated). Knowledge of ADB (Android Debug Bridge) and fastboot tools. Potentially, a working battery and functional USB port on the old device. Recovery Steps Try enabling USB debugging (if not already): If the phone boots normally and you can access settings, go to Settings > Developer options and enable USB debugging. If Developer Options is locked or inaccessible, this path may not be available. Connect the phone to a compatible PC: Use a original or high-quality USB cable. Try multiple USB ports and PCs if possible. Install legacy Android USB drivers (e.g., from Google or the phone manufacturer for 2010-era devices). Use ADB to pull wallet data (if USB debugging is on): Install Android SDK Platform Tools. Run: adb devices adb pull /data/data/de.schildbach.wallet/files/wallet.protobuff (Path may vary slightly depending on wallet version.) If successful, import this file into a modern Bitcoin wallet that supports legacy formats. If USB debugging is off and the phone is locked: Your only option is to gain root or recovery access without wiping data. Look for device-specific exploits from 2010–2013 that allow temporary root or recovery mode without data loss (e.g., via unrevoked, SuperOneClick, or GingerBreak). Try booting into custom recovery (like ClockworkMod) if previously installed. Use Android Studio or ADB in recovery mode (advanced): Boot into recovery (usually Volume Up + Power). If ADB works in recovery, try pulling the /data partition. Note: Most stock recoveries do not support ADB; custom ones do. Consider professional data recovery services: Some specialists focus on mobile forensic recovery and may extract chip data directly (e.g., via JTAG or chip-off methods), though this is costly and not guaranteed. Once wallet file is retrieved: Use the original Bitcoin Wallet app or compatible software to open the file. Transfer funds to a new, secure wallet immediately. ⚠️ Warning: Any attempt that involves flashing, factory resetting, or improper rooting may permanently erase your wallet data. Proceed with extreme caution.

yesdaddy_____

I know I had hundreds of btc based upon pictures and screen shots on my phones I had after the one in question. There is no PIN or password. It's also been a long time since I used Linux, Which I'm aware is the best OS to try to recover the BTC

yesdaddy_____

Thanks for the advice. Yeah, alot of DM'S alredy. Anyway, The device in question is an: Android Incredible model number: ADR6300VW I belive the android version is 2.3.4 (the device is dead, I need to charge it to give further info. *side note: google stopped supporting this OS awhile ago. Which makes this harder to recover. The Schlidbach app is not on the phone. But i believe once I access super user I can access the protected files. (My other apps, wallpaper etc are still there, so no. It hasn't been factory reset or anything. It does have an SD card. To my knowledge and as far as I can recall, there was no PIN, password or anything about a backup. It would just prompt " The amount in your wallet is quite high for carrying in your pocket. Please move some to a safer place" As far as I've researched the phone NEEDS to be rooted to gain access to the protected files. But as you said, rooting the phone like whiching the OS the clock work recovery mod may or in most cases WILL delete all data.

BitMartExchange

If the recovery phrase is correct and complete, the assets should be recoverable because they are on-chain, not stored inside the hardware device. Before resetting anything, slow down and verify the phrase privately, never type it into a website, never share it with support or DMs, and follow the manufacturer’s official recovery instructions only. Most losses in this situation come from panic or phishing, not from the locked PIN itself.

Solid-Individual-913

The problem with being this level of delusional is that the internet in 2000 was useful and crypto is still useless. Do people even talk about Web 3.0 anymore? Decentralized social media, ID, PIN, media, etc? Web 3.0 got replaced by DeFi, NFTs, RWA and a bunch of other useless shit that only serves to keep the scam going. At this point smart contracts from ETH SOL ADA or whatever are no different than any of the promises of bitconnect. More than a decade and nobody knows what the hell crypto does or what it will do. At the same time AI has revolutionized the world. AI is doing it all. War, cybersecurity, hacking, your homework, etc. We don't need a delusional conversation. If you have anything to say, use coherent arguments rather than aspirational commentary.

Cultural-Candy3219

Before you wipe anything, treat the recovery words as the source of truth and keep the process boring. A Ledger reset after too many bad PIN attempts is a normal safety path. It does not delete coins from the chain. What matters is restoring the same recovery phrase, and the big rule is: enter those words only on the hardware wallet itself. Do not type them into Ledger Live, a browser page, a phone note, a support chat, or any DM. The order I would follow: 1. Check that your paper backup has the full word count and the words are in exact order. Do not photograph it or run it through any online checker. 2. Use Ledger Live only from Ledger's official download/app source, then choose the restore-from-existing-phrase path on the device. 3. Enter the words on the Ledger screen/buttons, not on the computer keyboard. 4. Reinstall the apps and add the accounts again in Ledger Live. Balances may look empty until the relevant accounts are added and synced. 5. Once restored, do a tiny test transaction before moving anything large. If you are genuinely unsure the written phrase is correct, do not test it in a software wallet or random seed checker. The safer route is Ledger's official recovery-check flow on a trusted Ledger device, or official support instructions that never require you to reveal the phrase.

AutoModerator

Post is by: dantey_korir and the url/text [ ](https://goo.gl/GP6ppk)is: /r/CryptoMarkets/comments/1tnhtk8/my_hardware_wallet_pin_locked_after_i_entered_it/ I’m kind of stressing right now and hoping someone here has gone through this before. I was setting up my Ledger on a new laptop earlier today and somehow completely blanked on the PIN I usually use. I tried a couple combinations that I thought were right but after too many failed attempts the device locked itself and now it says it has to be reset before I can use it again. The part that’s making me nervous is that I still have my recovery seed phrase written down on paper and stored safely. I checked it and I’m pretty sure it’s correct, but the idea of doing a factory reset on the wallet still feels risky for some reason. I keep thinking “what if I reset it and then something goes wrong during recovery” or “what if I copied one word wrong years ago and never noticed.” From what I understand, the crypto itself is not actually stored on the Ledger device and the seed phrase is what really matters, but I’ve never had to fully recover a wallet before so this is new territory for me. I also saw mixed comments online where some people say the process is simple while others talk about recovery failures caused by mistakes in the phrase order or spelling. I haven’t reset the device yet because I wanted to ask people who have actually done this before. Is the reset process completely normal in situations like this? Did your balances and accounts come back normally after restoring from the seed phrase? Also is there anything important I should double check before starting the recovery process? Would appreciate advice from anyone who has dealt with this firsthand because right now I’m honestly nervous about touching anything further. *I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/CryptoMarkets) if you have any questions or concerns.*

AutoModerator

Post is by: AdGlass6838 and the url/text [ ](https://goo.gl/GP6ppk)is: /r/CryptoMarkets/comments/1tnayd9/my_hardware_wallet_pin_locked_after_i_entered_it/ I got a new laptop and was setting up my Ledger again. Kept entering what I thought was the PIN and it locked after too many attempts. The device now says it needs to be reset. I have the seed phrase written down and I know it's correct but I'm scared to do the factory reset in case it somehow goes wrong. Is the reset completely safe if I have the seed phrase *I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/CryptoMarkets) if you have any questions or concerns.*

Satochip

Great questions, let me break this down. **Seed phrase vs. private key** Your steel seed backup is enough. The seed phrase *generates* all your private keys deterministically (BIP32/BIP44), so you never need to write down individual private keys separately. Just the 24 words, correctly backed up, is the standard approach. **The passphrase (25th word) problem** This is the real challenge. The passphrase is powerful but if your friend loses it, the funds are gone forever. Options: \- **Another steel plate** stored in a completely separate location (bank safe, trusted family member) \- **A hardware secrets manager** like Seedkeeper: stores the passphrase encrypted in a secure chip, PIN-protected. Even if someone finds the card, they can't extract the passphrase without the PIN. It's essentially a hardware password manager that works offline \- **A sealed envelope with a notary**: low-tech but works **For your friend specifically** Since he's bad at remembering passwords and doesn't use a password manager, I'd actually lean toward [Seedkeeper](https://satochip.io/product/seedkeeper) here. It stores sensitive info in hardware without requiring him to memorize anything - just keep the card safe and remember a PIN. The [Satochip Academy has a good explainer on passphrases](https://satochip.io/passphrase/) if he wants to go deeper. Bottom line: steel plate for the seed, separate secure location for the passphrase, and never store them together.

guitarmonkeys14

“Brute force successful, please enter your 4-digit PIN”

SatoshiTrails

That works for people comfortable with the setup, the backup cards plus PIN approach removes a lot of the complexity. Main thing is making sure they actually know what the cards are and what to do with them.

ZedZeroth

Why wipe the Trezors if they're PIN protected? They're arguably safer than plaintext seedphrases. Another option would be to properly encrypt your seedphrase with a memorable but secure password. Upload to secure online storage. Take two wiped/new Trezors. On arrival immediately restore your old wallet and create a new one. Move funds from old to new. There is minimal risk there as the seedphrase is protected by two security systems and only for a day or two.

crunchyeyeball

A bitcoin private key is usually generated by a *wallet*. It is usually backed up with 12, 20, or 24 words (the "seed phrase") which can be used to backup/recover all private keys generated by the wallet. If you have a hardware wallet (e.g. Trezor, ColdCard, Ledger, etc.), a PIN (& the device) may also be enough to access the funds. If you have a wallet on a phone or PC, access to the phone/device/account may be enough. If you have funds on an exchange, login credentials may be enough.

Aazimoxx

If you'd just cut out most of the fluff then most people wouldn't have cared that you used an LLM to help form your thoughts into words - but instead it took a whole page to say this: *Self-custody solved the "exchange risk" problem, but it created an inheritance risk most people ignore. If your heirs don't have not just the seed phrase but also the passphrase, wallet details, PIN, and recovery instructions, your crypto can effectively die with you - regardless of wills or legal ownership.* And then you could've ended with something like "What're the best options we currently have for dealing with crypto inheritances, what do you use?" 🤷

Salty-Piglet-2443

Hi, I saw your post regarding the lost PIN on your Trezor from 2017. Since you have a significant amount (50,000€+), please be very careful with people offering "hacks" in your DMs. I work as a partner with KeychainX. They are a legally registered recovery firm that specializes in high-value hardware wallets. They have the computational power to recover PINs and passwords without risking your funds. They work on a "No Cure, No Pay" basis (20% fee only upon success). If you’re interested, let me know your email, and I’ll introduce you directly to Peter at KeychainX via a CC email to ensure your case is prioritized. Best regards, my email husseinjunior90@gmail.com

gowithflow192

If UK has done that 20 years ago with Blackberry PIN they could have avoided the entire country burning that summer.

loupiote2

Then it is most likely a Nano S. If you have the 4-digit unlocking PIN code, you can recover your funds (even if you list the 24-word recovery seed phrase). Connect the ledger on a USB plug, jnlock it, go in the Settings, the General, then look at the firmware version and post it here.

Infinite_Airline7705

Jade is a solid choice, open source and Bitcoin-friendly. The one thing to know is it requires a connection to a Blockstream server for the blind oracle PIN model unless you run your own node — worth understanding before you rely on it. 

loupiote2

As long as you have your 24-word recovery seed phrase, there is no issue at all, as you can enter it in a newer ledger device (or update the firmware of your old ledger). If you lost your seed phrase, there are ways to recover access to all cryptos secured by your old ledger without having to update the firmware (updating the firmware is not recommended is you lost your seed phrase). As long as your ledger device works and that you have the unlocking PIN, all cryptos secured by your ledger are recoverable. The tools to use and the efforts / difficulty depends on the type of cryptos that are secured by your ledger device. For example, BTC can generally be recovered by using Electrum, connected to your ledger device. Other cryptos may require using older versions of existing front-ends, or in some cases, custom low-level front-ends. Note: It is not recommended to update the device firmware if you lost the seed phrase, because if the update goes bad, you would permanently lose access to all your crypto. So, for safety, the recovery has to be done using the older firmware that is on your device.

Primary-Promotion588

HAHAAHAHAH PIN THIS, u have to be mental to think btc is not going below 50, ww3 is around the corner, countries are financially on the edge. Hell it will be bullish if we stay above 40. Not hating but if you say this then you are new in crypto.

ShinAlastor

If you lost the PIN to unlock the hardware wallet, you need to enter the SEED (24 mnemonic words) into another hardware wallet and if you also lost the SEED, it's a real problem since after three failed attempts to enter the PIN the Ledger wallet erases everything.

YSL_Crypto

Hopefully you have your seed phrase. If you do you can just setup another wallet with a new PIN using your seed phrase. Pin is for the physical device but the seed phrase is to access your BTC balance

na3than

You can, but what does that have to do with this discussion of cold wallets? A hardware wallet with a secure element encrypts the stored secret, but it also DECRYPTS the secret for any user who's able to authenticate to the device. If authentication is simply a PIN, the fact that the secret is encrypted is largely irrelevant. Stop deflecting and just answer my question: What makes you think a hardware wallet plus PIN is more secure than a mnemonic sentence plus passphrase? What cold storage attack vectors does it mitigate that a zero-device setup doesn't mitigate?

na3than

I know what a hardware wallet is. It's a secure signing device. OP's question wasn't about signing transactions or moving Bitcoin. It was about **cold wallets**. A device that, if found by an unauthorized person, has only a PIN protecting you from losing your Bitcoin is LESS SECURE than a mnemonic sentence stamped in stainless steel with a complex passphrase stored elsewhere.

na3than

If someone comes across your hardware wallet, can they access it and take your Bitcoin? Or would they need another secret - a PIN, for example - to do that? Do you keep the PIN with the hardware wallet, or do you store it elsewhere because your storage of the hardware wallet is insecure? How is a hardware wallet plus PIN more secure than a mnemonic sentence plus passphrase?

kansaludit

One thing most people overlook: your wallet is only as secure as the device it's on. Doesn't matter if you have a hardware wallet if your computer has malware logging your keystrokes when you enter your PIN. Use a clean machine for crypto, keep your OS updated, and never install browser extensions from unverified sources. I've seen more people lose funds to compromised browsers than to actual blockchain exploits.

na3than

I'm not. Explain to me why you think a PIN-protected hardware wallet is more secure than a mnemonic sentence on stainless steel with a passphrase stored in a separate location.

Low-Razzmatazz3932

Yeah it’s a bit different from the daily-use apps. Most crypto wallets don’t really use usernames/passwords. Your “login” is basically your private key or seed phrase. That’s the real access. Apps just put a PIN, Face ID, or fingerprint on top for convenience, but that’s just local security on your device. So yeah, losing access is still a risk. If you lose your seed phrase and your device, there’s no reset option like email/password apps. Biometrics and passkeys are starting to come in with newer wallets, but under the hood it still comes down to key ownership. The UX is improving, but the responsibility is still on you for now.

Cannister7

Weird that you're not getting this. He didn't have the mnemonic, the kids messed it up. He did, however, still have the device, presumably with a PIN to use it. So he created another wallet somewhere (maybe on the same device and switched back and forth, maybe somewhere completely separate), and then he used the devices and PIN to send funds to this new wallet. You only need the mnemonic in the case of losing the device or device PIN.

216_Cleveland

Physical security matters just as much as digital security. If someone can watch you input your seed phrase or private keys, all the hardware wallets in the world won't help. This case highlights why operational security (OPSEC) is critical: private spaces for crypto operations, secure storage of recovery materials, and never letting anyone observe your access methods. For anyone managing significant holdings: treat your crypto activities like banking. You wouldn't let someone watch you enter your PIN at an ATM.

xpresstuning

Copy Bluewallet. Having biometrics or a PIN is good if you lose your phone or someone has access to it, it doesn't do jack shit if the phone is compromised. The reason why I mention Bluewallet is because it's the only mobile software wallet in existence with an encryption feature (AES 256 standard) that, when enabled via a strong password, encrypts the entire file containing all your wallet data. Meaning that on top of Android/iOS device encryption, you've got Bluewallet's file encryption. Also mitigate risk as much as possible by lowering the attack surface -> Bitcoin-only. And make it 100% open-source so the code is fully verifiable.

xpresstuning

Checked out the security features, and it's the same deal as with the other dozens out there, with the exception of Bluewallet. They rely on your phone's OS-level encryption + biometrics/PIN for app access. The reason why i mention Bluewallet is because it's the only mobile software wallet that allows you to encrypt the entire app's storage (including your wallet data, seeds, etc.) on top of your phone's built-in encryption, by enabling the "Encrypted Storage" option via a strong password. Meaning, that on top of the OS encryption, you've got Bluewallet's encryption (AES-256), ***and*** the biometrics/PIN. No other wallet does that. And that's the reason why it's the best on mobile. Sparrow being the best on desktop.

G0mery

If someone is beating you with a wrench, it doesn’t matter if they’re asking for your bank PIN or your 24 word key

Top-Care-8946

Use cold wallet and make sure your PC does not have keyloggers or other malicious software. Generally it is safe to use exchanges for trading but it's not recommended to leave crypto on these platforms, instead of it transfer your funds onto your cold wallet as soon as possible. Actually your crypto remains on blockchain but private keys are stored in cold wallet's security chip, so in this case access to your account transactions are granted only through your cold wallet (user must to verify addresses and confirm (sign) manually the transaction). While using cold aka Hardware wallet then there is much less risk that input has been tracked or compromised (for additional security purposes HW wallet can be accessed with PIN and this input is done only on HW wallet and that input never leaves HW wallet, technically be tracked or logged from outside (PC). While using hot (online) wallet there is always risk that your computer is infected with malicious software and so all your keyboard keystrokes can be logged and sent to the host who then can see and guess your passwords. Bear in mind that you should never enter your seed phrase anywhere (for short term you can use paper but most secure is stamp seed phrases to the metal plate. If you use hot wallet and their seed input then these words can be too be tracked because you never know what's actually running in background on your PC.

marvinrabbit

Everything that Schrezberatina said. I use Trezor One now. However, I'd like to upgrade it to a Trezor Safe 5. For the seedwords, it defaults to SLIP-39 instead of BIP-39. I'd recommend looking at [Trezor's description of seedwords](https://trezor.io/learn/security-privacy/personal-security-standards/understanding-trezor-wallet-backups-12-20-or-24-words). The 20 word backup gives you a lot more flexibility on how that's set up. During setup, put a good PIN on your Trezor to avoid easy cracking if it falls into the wrong hands. **Do Not Ever** put your seeds on computer. That means no photo. No password file or database. No printer. *Be paranoid!* Don't speak them near a phone or microphone. Don't let a video or security camera observe you while you are recording and saving the seedwords. But you need to save the seedwords. That's the only thing that you do actually need to save. I'd recommend a technique called the [SAFU Ninja](https://youtu.be/3Aj_EHOu9WE) which is basically hand stamping the words into a series of washers. The nice thing about this technique is that it is just a valid regardless of the number of seedwords. So it doesn't matter if you are doing 12, 20, or 24 words. Plus with some of the more advanced options of SLIP-39, you have the option of doing multiple sets (or shards) of seeds and setting a restore option to require, say, any 2 out of 3 sets, etc. So with the SAFU Ninja, you may have (a relatively modest) upfront cost of a stamp set, but then the per use price is very affordable.

blockstreamHQ

Stateless mode is amazing BUT y'all are sleeping on what the blind oracle really does. Even after you've set up your Jade, the blind oracle keeps it effectively stateless. There's still nothing stored on the device for someone to extract. That's the whole security model. What makes this great: you can travel with an initialized Jade and just use your PIN. No seed words written down, no QR codes to carry, nothing physical to secure except the device itself. And if it gets stolen or confiscated? There's literally nothing on it to compromise your funds. The server never sees your PIN or keys, open-source code. No secure element on Jade means it's fully open-source, so you can verify this yourself. If you don't trust the oracle at all? Yes, run it air-gapped via QR or use temporary signer mode. Or run your own!! But for traveling? Initialized Jade with PIN unlock is unmatched. Stateless security with hot wallet convenience.

pezdal

Any security question needs to weigh the cost/benefits and also consider the threat model. Just as you wouldn’t buy a $700,000 bank vault to protect a $70 watch, you need proportional costing BTC storage too. It works the other way too. Nobody is going to crack the chip on your Trezor model 3 for 0.1 BTC. Have more? Is your adversary going to buy a scanning tunneling microscope or an $8 pipe wrench to hit you with until you spit out your PIN?

Top-Care-8946

I started with Trezor Safe3 as beginner. All is still OK. I think that main difference between TS7 and TS3 is that TS7 is more comfortable to handle as well as TS5 because these HW wallets have a touch screen while TS7 has biggest touch screen in the product line. For me the only downside is that navigating and confirming/selecting with two buttons simultaneously is not good and does not always succeeds. Mistyping for an example the PIN code initiates time-delay countdown by doubling the power of two each time the wrong PIN is entered. But I personally decided to start with crypto by using TS3 because it is available at very affordable price and has good security/manageability/price ratio. No overthinking just double checks of everything and I like that it is also very lightweight. And generally I think that having USB-only device increases also security because without Bluetooth connection it's not discoverable by nearby bluetooth devices , so less risks to get too much attention even if it is promised that it is safe to use HW wallet over bluetooth. TS3 is fully offline that only gives and option to sign transactions or settings made/changed in suite. I know that TS7 has advanced security features but currently I don't need that level of security.

XysterU

Sooooo anyone can steal your money by getting near your hand with an nfc device and you wouldn't even know it happened? I hope he did some authorization step on his phone before this. Id rather tap to pay BTC with a phone that requires a PIN/biometric to send BTC

Evoke_Solutions

You're already ahead of most executors because you found both the device AND the recovery phrase. Here's the simple version: \*\*To find out what she owned:\*\* 1. Download Trezor Suite (the official app) on your computer 2. Plug in the Trezor Safe 3 3. Enter the PIN you found 4. It'll show you all the Bitcoin (and any other crypto) on that wallet 5. You can see the current value and generate a transaction history I wont get into probate and time-stamping valuations but I'm sure you're on this. I actually built a tool (Evoke Schedule) specifically for this situation - it helps executors and families document crypto holdings properly for probate and ultimately recovery. But honestly, for a single Trezor wallet with $1000, you can probably handle it yourself with the steps above. This is literally what I do. DM me if you get stuck. Also: \*\*Keep that recovery phrase somewhere very secure.\*\* That's literally the keys to the Bitcoin. If someone gets that phrase, they can take the Bitcoin. Don't photograph it, don't email it, don't store it digitally.

Technical_Car3729

You just plug it in, put in the PIN or the words and there you go You download the trezor suite on your computer to look at it

20seh

Just to be sure: do not give anyone that PIN or these words. Ignore any direct messages.

keefyboy452

With multi-share the passphrase only provides the benefits of plausible deniability, should someone force you to PIN unlock the device. Because of this, it doesn't have to be greatly complex. This situation should be considered by each individual and their resistance to torture...but I digress. I should mention that if you get comfortable recovering with the multi-shares, DESTROY the single share because that single share creates a single source of failure, should someone find it.

EarlyWin21

When you send bitcoin to a self hosted wallet (idealy a properly set up hardware wallet = cold wallet), each time you send an amount of bitcoin you create a new UTXO. Therefore if your wallet software can handle UTXO management (which should typically be the case), it would technically be possible to separate UTXOs that belong to different persons. BUT I would not recommend that practice because: \- It might get pretty cumbersome from a tax calculation perspective (who owns which UTXOs and how to prove?). \- Anyone who has access to the wallet (either through the physical device + PIN or through the SEED phrase) has automatically access to all UTXOs. So all participants must trust all participants 100 % and all time.

uncapchad

1. Do not answer DMs or take any advice, help, follow links etc from private chats 2. If you plug the Nano in does it power up? Do you remember the PIN that you set on your Ledger? If NO, you'll have to go through a recovery process with the 24 words. Post a comment and someone will tell you how to go about that. 3. If YES then * Download the official Ledger Live app from https://www.ledger.com/ledger-live. * Connect your Ledger Nano device via USB. * Pass the genuine check (device verifies it’s authentic). * Enter your **PIN** to unlock the device.  * Once unlocked, Ledger Live will **automatically detect your accounts** and display your balances — no seed phrase required.  * ✅ **Important**: Never enter your seed phrase on your computer. If any app asks for it, it’s a scam. The seed phrase should **only** be entered directly on your Ledger device during setup or recovery. 

CompetitiveAppeal663

I see….that sucks. How did they know you had a wallet??? Did your wallet have a pass phrase? PIN?

justlukedotjs

Here's the thing no talking about: This is not just about making money.. it's about investing in the future economic infrastructure you want for the entire globe. When you put your money into something like XMR or any kind of truly decentralized piracy-focused chain, you are placing a vote for privacy-based transactions. Same goes for truly decentralized AMMs and all kinds of DeFI and PIN solutions. If a public and decentralized system does not take off in the mainstream, then the alternative is exactly what we have now.. except a level of control over the entire economic and financial infrastructure that the world has never seen before. CBDC's are coming like a storm. Read the patents. Read the research. Look into the trials. You are going to have the elite of the elites issue you a *programmable currency*. They are selling all of the solutions it will create, but addressing none of the truly terrifying concerns. Digital IDs combined with CBDC's mean that you are 100% tracked and traced across your entire digital footprint. This will all be handled on PRIVATE blockchains. Businesses will be incentivized to join/connect directly into these private chains because it will automate everything for them and handle all reporting and tax obligations. Once you are on THE network... that's full control. I urge people to continue investing in the technology that is going to move us way from this so that at the very least there is SOME kind of meaningful resistance or alternative. Putting your money in these chains developing these alternatives means that developers and other talent will be attracted to move into these spaces. Stop thinking only of how you are going to profit in the moment. It's so much bigger than that. If you're the type of person that only sees and values "Crypto" as an asset to make money from and doesn't even care to move their coins off of the central exchange you bought them on... pick up your game, or you are part of the problem.

SteveW928

I really don't think about it at all. A hardware wallet is a signing tool (and seed phrase generating tool). If it fails, I get another. No biggie. It's really that simple, and I do fear too many think of their hardware wallets logically more like wallets than signers. That is unfortunate naming. Your seed phrase backup strategy really should be everything you're depending on. You can add a passphrase (BIP-39, part of the Bitcoin spec, not to be confused with a password or PIN number) for security to your strategy.

sos755

Gaining access to a Google or Coinbase account or even personal data does not give anyone access to a hardware wallet. 1. The only way use a hardware wallet is to have physical access to the device and know it's PIN (or whatever security it has). 2. The only way is to send the crypto protected by a hardware wallet without having physical access to the device is to gain access to the seed phrase. One likely possibility is that your friend obtained the Trezor from the scammers (perhaps they posed as legitimate sellers), and he used the seed phrase that *they* installed on the device. They told your friend that the Coinbase account was compromised in order to get him to send his coins to the device. Since they knew the seed phrase for the device, they were able to take the coins.

loupiote2

Pretty strange. From what you describe, your device does not currently contain the same recovery seed phrase that was in it when you created your accounts. Updating the firmware cannot normally cause that to happen, event if interrupted as you describe. If the device still has its unlocking PIN, it shoukd still have the same recovery seed phrase stored in it. It the device had reset, id wouldd lose bothe the unlicking PIN and the seed phrase, and it woukd display "welcome" when plugged in. In the past, did you ever reset your device and generated a new seed phrase with it?

Ibshake

Yeah but so is your bank account your countless passwords and your 4 digit PIN number under threat.

eNSU1122

They should be scared of QC for their 4-digit bank PIN. This is all bullcrap

tre6123

nah they need your PIN. without it the device locks them out

metalzip

I know of following (some might be myself, other might be friends) : - entering extra passphrase from memory few times. all worked to generate receiving address. On future attempts to use incoming funds turned out the passphrase I entered that one time was other than I remember. - lost password to encrypted disk - lost disks. they were in RAID, both died at same time - lost disk, no RAID - lost PIN to device (low value) Most of them lost basically "all of it". Be very careful, people. And don't put all eggs in one basket. Also test each few months do you actually remember.

CryptoYuzu

***MOST*** of Ledger's source code should be available on GitHub. Also, I couldn't care less about data leaks and you shouldn't either unless it is putting your life in danger. If you fall for a phishing email, you're just stupid. Everyone here should care about the actual technology and threat model of their devices. For example, Ledger's operating system runs within the secure element. Your PIN, private keys, applications, etc. are all stored within the secure element chip. As for Trezor, this is not the case. The private keys are not stored within the secure element chip(s), your PIN is. The private key is encrypted on your MCU, not on the secure element.

110010010011

What is the format of the password? Is it 12, 20, or 24 words? You have a seed phrase. To check the balance and send/sell Bitcoin, you’ll need to enter the seed phrase into a hardware wallet like ones sold by Trezor, Coldcard or Ledger - or into a software wallet like Electrum. Is it a number around 4-8 digits? You probably have a PIN to a hardware wallet. Without access to the wallet, the password is useless and worthless. Is it a single word? Could be the password to an account on a website like Coinbase. You need to know the website, associate email address and have access to the whatever device was being used for 2FA (likely the original owner’s cell phone). It also could be a passphrase, which is an extra word typically used with a 24 word seed phrase. Without the additional words, the password is useless and worthless.

Patient-Fruit-2946

I admire the trust in such gadgets. Type in the wring PIN too often and the BTC are gone. Technical malfunction and it is becoming a digital grave.

110010010011

Everyone assumes the seed backup is shady, and I get it. But it's really just a feature designed for idiots. You can't turn on seed backup without the PIN to the Ledger. Just like you can't send BTC without the PIN to the Ledger. For people who choose to use seed backup, well, I can't really defend that. You've converted your self-custody into shared custody, which is maybe 10% better than just keeping everything on an exchange anyway.

Lv_InSaNe_vL

> i guess my 4 digit bank code is useless too? I mean, assuming its just numbers in your PIN, its already easily cracked. You can break 12-digit or less numbers basically as soon as you ask a modern computer to do it. That's only ~1 trillion combinations or so. Even if you have an 8-digit code with all Unicode characters possible its able to be cracked in under a minute.

Flamboiant_Canadian

It's just an extra layer of protection. So if someone does find your seed, they can't access your funds without the passphrase.  Mine is a 20 digit alphanumerical passphrase including symbols, which makes it basically as encrypted as it gets. I even have an x digit PIN attached to my passphrase/seed AND Metamask on top.  If you're worried about security, more security is always better. 

riscten

Decent setup, although I'm not a fan of the PIN either. One system I like is just vanilla 2-of-3 multisig. Stamp the mnemonics on metal and distribute geographically. Keep one mnemonic at home, and memorize one or both of the others. Only requires a single hardware wallet. Keep it stateless. Coldcard calls this [temporary seed](https://coldcard.com/docs/temporary-seeds/), but it can be done manually by just wiping any wallet after use. That way your keys are not even stored on it. Memorizing the other mnemonics means that you can still access your funds without traveling. And if you forget them, no biggie, you just go and retrieve them. If you spend Bitcoin regularly (and you should!), just maintain a Lightning wallet with a small sum that you replenish from your income or from your stash, kind of like a spending account. Regarding the duress thing, it's all about balancing how much you keep in the decoy wallet. If it's not enough, your attacker will ask where the rest is, and if it's too much, you risk losing a lot to the attack. You can setup a decoy wallet with multisig too. Just send the funds to the singlesig wallet that's derived from the one mnemonic you keep at home. By any chance, native French speaker?

drifterlady

How did you get any crypto in there? Or are you really saying, you've not lost the PIN but you don't have the wallet?

drifterlady

You don't need the PIN to know how much is in there.

disruptioncoin

It's not just like the ledger. The Trezor Model One does not use a (closer source) secure element at all. It’s built around a general-purpose MCU, with fully open-source firmware and hardware, and no closed-source chip inside. Its security model prioritizes transparency over physical tamper resistance, which means it’s more vulnerable if an attacker has prolonged physical access. The Trezor Model T adds an (opt in) closed-source secure element, but it does not store private keys. Keys remain handled by open-source firmware on the main MCU, while the secure element is used for defense-in-depth features like PIN enforcement and physical attack hardening. Trezor treats it as an extra layer, not a root of trust. The ledger keeps the private keys inside the closed source secure element.

Aazimoxx

Eh? You mean a limit he can set himself? We have that on accounts here in Australia, but it's something you can modify yourself in minutes on internet banking - it's only intended as a limiter on some random getting a hold of your card and PIN and draining the account easily. I have mine set at a really low cap ($200) for cash withdrawal and $500 for purchases, and simply up it in my app temporarily if I need to make a larger withdrawal or purchase. Without having to call anyone it's simple in this app to increased the daily cash withdrawal limit to $2000, and it only takes a short phone call to temporarily increase that to up to 10k for 24-48hrs if needed. You can also withdraw up to 10k in branch without much hassle, but anything over that and they want you to call first. Best to give them notice the day before so they can plan to have some fat stacks ready for you 😎👍 They'd probably question you if you're pulling out tens of thousands, but end of the day it is your money 🤷‍♂️ That amount of hassle over £2.5k ($5k australian) is fucking nuts, even without any notice. Even the kiosk at the mall wouldn't bat an eye at that lol

jayggg

So much for the trick PIN.

na3than

You are wrong. A hardware wallet may be protected by A PIN or short password, but that's not the same as a *passphrase* used in the creation of a Bitcoin wallet. "Paraphrase" isn't a thing.

IM-PT24

Have you been in a under ground bunker or something? That was like 6 months ago, and well discussed already. Supply chain attack can affect all hardware wallets. The solution is the same as always, buy only from the manufacturer itself, test your wallet with multiple transactions (both directions), use pass phrase and PIN, keep your device and your backups same.

Ok-Sentence-6222

No one should be able to find your hard wallet anyway to even attempt it. 2048 seed words possible with a PIN, locked in a safe within a safe or safety deposit box with a combination only you know is all the security you'll need if you are a small time investor.

karbonator

It is possible that if he was an OG Bitcoiner, some portion of it is in Bitcoin Core on his PC. The bulk of it is likely on a hardware wallet which depending on the model is maybe a little bigger than a flash drive, and should be locked away in a safe or something. Unfortunately for you, it'll be protected by a PIN or password. Hopefully his seed phrase is in that same safe - it'll be 12-24 words. Since this has been several years it's also possible he had it in a paper wallet. In this case it could be handwritten or printed, and there were a couple different formats people used but you'll know that's what it is by finding seemingly random strings of characters. You'll need to look at some examples online to figure out what format he used and what is the private key. Just a tip: if he was ever into 3D printing, it's a somewhat-common trick to embed your secrets in a print.

faithOver

If quantum is at a point of being a challenge to crypto, then by that point any PIN or password protection is out the window for banking or any other security.

NoChanceItsHer

"In 2021, during a law enforcement search of his home in Gainesville, Georgia, agents found hardware containing the private keys to those wallets (including a device hidden in a popcorn tin)." He didn't give it up, they didn't hack it, they got his device and got it from there. I'm guessing no PIN, no duress PIN, no passphrase, no multi-sig etc. Their own security lapses lead to the govt being able to confiscate it.

special_rub69

Trezors are not easy to bruteforce unless your PIN is something like: 1234 or your birthday. Stop spreading misinformation and read about how secure element works.

HSuke

Yep. It qualifies as 2FA * Something you have: hardware device * Something you know: the PIN to that device This correction gives me more respect for Ledger for taking a step in the right direction. I hope Trezor and more crypto device signers follow too. It'll take many years to clear up confusion.

110010010011

Are you taking about the PIN? That’s not a passphrase.

golovcovadim

Syfra cards store your seed encrypted with AES‑256 inside a secure element. You can create a backup card or split the seed with Shamir’s Secret Sharing (2-of-3, etc.). Recovery is fully offline: the cards perform cryptographic operations locally and release the seed only after PIN verification.

grndslm

Create a truly RANDOM seed with high entropy (research this, like rolling a die 128 times) & open source software.  Write the seed down ONLY on paper / steel.  NEVER digitally!! Make a small test transaction.  Wipe the device (assuming this is a hardware wallet) & put your seed in.  If you see your test transaction, then YOU'RE GOOD.  Next steps are to use a BIP-38 passphrase (not a PIN) to generate a NEW wallet, based off that seed.  Store your funds in that NEW wallet, and then stamp/engrave your seed into 2 or 3 stainless steel plates, stored in various locations.  Let your family know where the seed plate(s) are... but come up with a dead man's switch that gives them a treasure map to where the passphrase & other personal passwords might be.

ogxubaidx

I went with Best Wallet for day to day because it felt intuitive, then I added a hardware wallet for long term storage. My routine is seed phrase on paper, app locked with PIN and biometrics, and a small test send before any larger move. I also keep a written restore checklist so I’m not guessing under stress. Starting simple and upgrading in steps made the whole process less scary. That approach may work if you’re just getting set up.

OddFruit9542

I settled on Best Wallet for hot use since it’s simple and supports strong app locks. For security, I keep it as a spending wallet with small balances, store the seed offline, and enable a PIN plus biometrics. I always double check the address and do a tiny first transaction. Keeping big holdings separate from a hot wallet has helped me sleep better. It may not be perfect, but that setup has been reliable for me.

North-Inspection-695

From my experience, Best Wallet handles my hot funds while a Ledger stays offline for savings. If you stick with Ledger, consider adding a passphrase, turn on PIN auto-lock, and practice a restore on a spare device before loading real funds. I also create a watch-only wallet so I can verify deposits without plugging the hardware in. Metal backups for the seed can reduce the risk of water or fire damage.

Ok-Professional6723

When I compared different wallets, Best Wallet consistently stood out for a clean UI and straightforward fee controls. For a hot wallet I want quick sends, good backup, and clear address display, and this one checks those boxes for me. I keep only what I’m comfortable with on mobile and use basic hygiene like PIN, biometrics, and no screenshots of seeds. If you’re moving larger amounts, you can split funds across wallets to reduce risk.

SherbetFluffy1867

I could not find any independent third-party verification (e.g., security advisories, CVE entries) confirming the exact vulnerability as described (constant digest + nonce reuse in Delta PIN mode) by other researchers or by Coldcard/Coinkite themselves. The blog also appears on a site that strongly markets unrelated products (VPNs, “Vitamin-K”, etc.). That commercial overlay lowers credibility. The tone and style of the blog post is highly dramatic, overly simplified, and oriented toward crypto-fear, which can be consistent with marketing or scam tactics. The vendor (Coldcard) firmware changelog does not publicly reference that specific issue (as per the publicly visible change logs I reviewed). That doesn’t guarantee non-existence, but it means it lacks official acknowledgement.

JanPB

Trezor Safe 3 solves the mist important problems (the typing on the desktop and the PIN stealing w/o the 2FA). Airgapping seems an overkill for me but YMMV.

mldefense12

I get your point, but that’s not how Tangem works. Your keys are generated and stored securely on the chip inside the card, they never touch the internet or your phone. The app is just an interface, kind of like mirroring your phone screen to a TV, the TV shows what’s happening, but can’t actually control your phone. Also, Tangem isn’t a blind signer, you can clearly see all transaction details in the interface before approving anything. Honestly, it’s safer than tiny hardware screens where it’s easy to make a mistake. Here’s the flow: you review your transaction, tap the card to your phone, then enter your PIN. Everything has to be confirmed step-by-step, so there’s no way to accidentally send funds. Not saying Cypherock is bad, just that with Tangem, your keys are stored inside the card, not in the app and it’s definitely not a blind signer. You can verify every detail before you approve.

canada11235813

Get a Trezor, jump through the hoops with respect to creating a new wallet with a recovery phrase and all that… and just hand it all over to them; the codes and the PIN for the Trezor. You could also keep a copy of the recovery phrase in a safe place in case they lose it all.

Bitchinfussincussin

#WELL NOW WE KNOW WHO TO PIN THIS ON ^/sitwasalreadyobvious

socky110

Hello! It seems your Trezor is now in anti-brute-force mode. This security feature activates when multiple incorrect PIN attempts are made (even accidentally). Each wrong attempt increases the waiting time exponentially, that’s why it’s showing 1000 seconds to verify your pin. Have you been able to resolve it now?

uncapchad

The Trezor PIN entry system implements an exponentially increasing delay after each failed attempt to prevent brute-force attacks. The delay doubles with every incorrect PIN entry, meaning the wait time follows a power-of-two progression (2, 4, 8, 16, 32 seconds, etc.) After 16 consecutive incorrect PIN attempts, the device automatically wipes itself, rendering the PIN ineffective and requiring the recovery seed to restore access

a-thousand-hours

You’re obviously entering the wrong PIN

JanPB

Just in case this needs to be repeated: coins are NOT stored in the wallet. The term is historical and we are stuck with it. The coins reside in the cloud (on the Bitcoin network) in the form of a globally accessible ledger file, aka. blockchain. The wallet OTOH is like a web browser mixed with an authenticator: it gives you access to the funds on the network, similar to logging in to your bank page with, say, a USB secure stick (your money in the bank is not stored in that stick!) So it sort of feels like a "wallet" but it's important to know that losing it or damaging it is like losing a web browser: a non-event. The only thing that must be protected is the seed phrase and the PIN used to unlock the "wallet".

nycteris91

I basically set up an old phone with Lineage OS that is all the time offline, they know the PIN to unlock. Inside there is Electrum.

Zzzaxx

They can't recover seeds, at least according to their website. If you still have your device and PIN, you can recover it, but to my knowledge, no device, no PIN, no seed, it's gone forever

Key-Boat-7519

Your data on Web3 is only as safe as your key management, approval habits, and the off-chain stuff you connect to. My playbook: split wallets (burner for mints, hot for daily, cold vault on a Ledger/Trezor), use Safe with 2-of-3 for anything that hurts to lose, and turn on the passphrase/25th word on hardware. Never grant unlimited approvals; set exact amounts and regularly clear with [revoke.cash](http://revoke.cash) or Etherscan’s token approvals. Use a simulator wallet like Rabby or Pocket Universe to spot drainers before you sign. Lock exchange logins with hardware keys (FIDO2), not SMS; add a carrier port-out PIN. For privacy, assume on-chain is public; if you must store sensitive stuff off-chain (IPFS/Arweave), encrypt first (Lit Protocol works). Set address alerts on Etherscan or Tenderly so you know fast if something moves. For ops: I’ve used Safe and Alchemy for wallet/RPC hygiene, and DreamFactory to expose a read-only API with RBAC to off-chain data so a compromised dapp can’t yank everything. Security comes from strict key hygiene, segmented wallets, limited approvals, and cautious infra, not the word “decentralized.

110010010011

No. Passphrases are generally used for self-custody, like on a Trezor or Ledger. It’s also an option security measure. You will need to create a PIN, but that gives you access to the device. It’s not a backup for the wallet like the 24 words and passphrase would be.

HedgehogGlad9505

AI is right. Just follow step 1-8, and your ledger will hold the passphrase protected wallet until you turn it off. At this point, you can use it normally, either with ledger live, or an open source 3rd party app like sparrow. When you are done, unplug the ledger. Then you can plug it back in and repeat step 1-8, this time with a different passphrase. The PIN in step 1 has to be the one for your first wallet - with 24 and no passphrase.