PC

Low_Tax672

Under a minute on a normal PC if the master seed is already known

stanley_fatmax

Apparently this is hard for many people, but I agree. An old laptop with the wireless chipset taken out, Linux, Electrum, a watch-only wallet on your main PC to receive, create, and broadcast transactions. If it's too difficult, you may be better off just using an ETF or custodian. Being your own bank isn't designed to be easy, it's designed to be secure.

Strong_Judge_3730

Trezor already combines multiple enthropy sources including from your PC.

Music_Fan76

This is exactly what I do I boot into tails is then do what I do then reboot PC no worries.

BTCGlobeLive

On Q1: the cost of running a node is capped by consensus, not by what people choose to put in blocks. Three things I measured on my own node this morning. **Blocks are already full.** Last 1,008 blocks (one week): average weight 3,929,788 out of the 4,000,000 limit. That's 98.2%. Junk doesn't create new space, it competes for space that was already being paid for. **The growth rate is bounded.** At last week's actual block sizes, the chain grows 86 GB/year. The absolute ceiling, if every block were maximally witness-heavy, is 210 GB/year. That ceiling is a consensus rule and nothing in this debate changes it. **How much of it is OP_RETURN?** Last 20 blocks, 95,539 transactions: 64,260 OP_RETURN outputs totalling 1,389,828 bytes = 4.44% of the block bytes, averaging 21 bytes each. Twelve of those 64,260 were over 83 bytes. Twelve. Being fair to your worry: the genuinely big payloads ride in witness data, not in OP_RETURN, so don't take 4.44% as a measure of all "spam" - but it does mean the OP_RETURN limit was never where the volume was. What regular people should do is the practical part. My archival node is 899 GB (blocks 809, chainstate 11, indexes 80) - but that's a choice, not a requirement. The part that actually enforces every rule is the 11 GB chainstate. My second node is pruned, on a used mini PC behind Tor, and it validates exactly the same rules as the big one. Pruning has been there since 2016 and it's the honest answer to "can normal people still afford this". On 1.1, the factual half: a pruned node validates that data and then deletes it, it never keeps it. The legal half I'm not qualified to answer. Q2 I'll pass on. I don't have an opinion to offer on the governance, only what my node measures.

Liquid_zer0

I can’t speak for all wallet manufacturers but the wallet I have, you can either setup your passphrase using the device OR you can set it up by typing it into the app on your PC. I opted to type it into my device for extra security. I used to not be this paranoid if you wanna know the truth but after this whole cold card hack and seeing people lose a combined $130 million it makes you realize we have to be extra safe and take security seriously. When you get hacked your funds don’t come back like a bank or credit card.

elchontole

Oh boohoo poor me i live in the richest country on earth. Try living in indonesia with average monthly salary is less than 300 usd while living cost is more or less adjusted by the economic parity will left almost any average Indonesian with literally nothing. Mind you we still pay international price for electronics, even more due to low exchange rate and high “luxury” tax, because apparently anything but food is luxury in indonesia Oh did i forget to mention the average house price in indonesia is 50k usd, good luck buying one with 300 usd salaries You know what? You can tru visit the indonesian subreddit and see for yourself, what you crackers consider a “normal” life is considered a upper-middle class in indonesia like owning car, AC and a PC, The car price here is almost double that in the us because the car tax aline is almost the same price with the car Hurray for communism, i meant pancasila ideology

HicEstLeoSuperbus

Building the hardware yourself… you must have missed the part where I said “air gapped PC”

Altruistic-Walrus-34

Some years ago, I had a hard time using an old PC to calculate the last word, and I drilled its hard drive afterwards. No regrets haha. That experience led me to start developing an offline BIP39 calculator. After the CC incident, I was kind of forced to come clean and make it public. [https://www.seedmate.net/seedmateblog/what-is-seedmate](https://www.seedmate.net/seedmateblog/what-is-seedmate)

sunsetreunion

Your point is very good, thanks for clarifying your position. Rolling the 11/23 words manually with dice, and then guess-and-checking the 12th/24th word with the hardware wallet (as you propose) does seem like it would be a more secure solution for generating a checksum word than the 2nd link solution I propose above. However, generating the receiving addresses using the hardware wallet from the seed phrase is another issue altogether. Using a hardware wallet, you are trusting that the custom and niche hardware/firmware/software layers have all been implemented correctly. Whereas if you use a permanently  air-gapped PC running audited JavaScript code in the browser, you need only trust that the general purpose computer and the browser running the code are behaving normally. While its true that a thief could compromise the cryptographic SHA-256 primitive in the Firefox browser to generate deterministic keys, the number of developers relying upon the cryptographic integrity of Firefox is massive compared to the relatively few developers who are looking at the code running on a hardware wallet. Case in point: the ColdCard fiasco. I know of no such similar attack on cryptographic primitives that has occurred on general purpose computers that has lost people bitcoin. Is it possible? Yes. But I believe the Cold Card attack shows that it's much easier to compromise these custom hardware devices than general purpose computers.  That being said, generating identical receiving addresses using identical derivation paths on two (or more) different devices would probably be pretty secure, but is arguably more difficult to accomplish than using a general purpose computer. Thanks for your thoughtful input.

ghavhqydb

I wrote my own python codes to generate mnemonics using dice rolled bits, then used the 3rd website above to verify my codes via testing inputs. Once all done, I put my python codes in an air-gaped PC and ran mnemonics generations there.

sunsetreunion

No, a hot wallet means it was connected to the internet. A permanently air-gapped PC is not connected to the internet at the time of seed generation, nor is it ever connected to the internet again. Thus, there's no hot, only cold, because there is no connection to any online interface, not now, or ever again, on the device.  I've described this multiple times, but there seems to be a communication gap in my description of "air-gapped". Why was/is this unclear to you?

sunsetreunion

In case you're unfamiliar with the term "air-gapped", it means a computer that is not connected to the internet. I tried to clarify in my post that not should this be run on an air-gapped PC, but that the PC should be permanently air-gapped (i.e. no Internet connection today, tomorrow, or ever again).

tenor_tymir

Did you do it on a PC that is occasionally connected to the internet?

Ok-Mango5075

Very early software wallets about 13 years ago relied on androids built in random number generator to make a seed. This generator was faulty as well. This was patched out in subsequent android releases. Not long afterwards hardware devices were brought onto the market. I never found a compelling reason to trust them. I was a very active bitcoin user back then. First with Multibit on PC and then I was searching for an android self custody wallet. The first one arrived called Mycelium. Now this seemed a more sensible combination. An audited self custody wallet running on a mass market Android cell phone. Where are the back doors? Well as time has now shown...Not many.

Mammoth-Ad-168

You could type the code directly into the calculator's keypad, but that would be a nightmare, right? Instead, you write the Python code on a PC, connect the calculator via a USB cable so it shows up as an external drive, copy the code file over, and then load and run it directly on the calculator.

crimeo

That's assuming your PC started out clean with zero malware or anything. A seed phrase should never be on a computer that will be connected to the internet ever again (at least not prior to being completely formatted fist maybe), for even a microsecond.

Thin_Needleworker795

You're completely wrong. Using a PC is a terrible idea, as the attack surface is much larger. You should use something like a SeedSigner instead.

rgnet1

The 24 word seed phrase is just a replacement for an actual number between 1 and 2\^256. That is more atoms in the knowable universe. No one can guess it. All encryption is based on this type of “improbability”, not just bitcoin. The Coldcard “hack” - if that’s even the right word - was the discovery that the wallet did NOT generate a random number up to 2\^256, instead if fell in a specific range of 2\^40 - approx 1 trillion. That is a very easy number of combinations for machines today. You can guarantee a random number guess of 2\^256 using a well documented method of dice rolls, card draws or even coin flips. Also, cryptographic libraries for every programming language running on a standard desktop PC can do it reliably. Coldcard is an embedded device suffering from a serious human coding error, nothing more.

piejlucas

Right? I see people here with a couple hundred in crypto insisting that everyone should take responsibility for their seed phrase integrity while advocating hardware wallets or even steel plates. Etc. this is fine if you plan on taking your crypto to the grave but for anyone with a family, being your own bank carries tremendous responsibility that most family members are not prepared for. I still have deep anxiety issues whenever I connect my wallet to my PC for transactions. I don’t wish that on any of my family. Perhaps in some third world country this is indeed the best approach. But the day the US takes away my crypto holdings then we clearly have much bigger problems.

piejlucas

This may not help but many years back I too suffered a loss. Nearly 12 BTC gone to someone who installed a key logger on my PC. It was an $11k loss at the time. Instead of resigning myself to Bitcoin I got a hardware wallet and repurchased the lost coins as soon as I was able. Those coins ended up costing me nearly 2x what the lost batch did. But the years passed and my investment went on to eclipse the loss. Today I would advise the same except I would suggest you consider an ETF or custody at Fidelity. Those options did not exist for me back then.

scrandlle

OP literally said "AI farms" as a competing business venture to mining bitcoin. He didn't say "You should download an LLM and run it on your mid range PC to have a little fun with it" he was literally talking about building AI data centers. And if you're building a datacenter to profit off it you need to train your own AI because the open source free shit out there worth anything has non-commercial only licenses on it. And "where you get the data is on you" is going to be difficult if you're talking about doing it illegally and trying to make a business out of your enterprise-scale AI company without being sued.

satsugene

They can both be true.  People try to use Tails Linux, for example, which is a really neat and useful platform, and hold their keys in persistent storage, and one bad update or USB thumb drive failure lose it. Same issue with RPi/SD card implementations. Worse if they try to VM it (dumped memory state attacks, vulnerable hosts). Folks rolling their own on stuff they barely understand and won’t keep up to date, or build using out of date YT walkthroughs instead of current official instructions, caries different but similar consequence risks. Then it becomes how do they backup the key. Too many are going to type it on their phone or PC or photograph it, or not back it up at all.

downtherabbit

After all of this nonsense recently I feel like an airgapped PC with a high entropy dice roll key and a very well secured physical back up of the seed is the safest possible way. Apart from a trustworthy-proof of reserve exchange.

Overwatch_1ightning

I know this is hard to swallow but you need a PC that is set up for one task. And that is connecting your hardware wallet. Everything else from emails, to gaming has to be done on your main PC and never mixed between the two. A PC like that is very inexpensive as well, as it is simply your banking terminal. Almost all of your problems are solved, only physical access would be a huge threat as always. But having the keys used only on one trusted service is your best bet. It's not bullet proof, but no plan is. It simply is like not washing your hands before preparing food, it will probably be ok but you also might get salmonella poisoning. People want to takes risks and they can, that's the nature of critical thinking and not the fault of cryptocurrencies. A stringent security protocol is essential for all things on life.

Overwatch_1ightning

Dude I mined 5 BTC or something when I was a kid on my PC. Ended up wiping it several times for video game space. This shit has happened and will happen over and over. That's the thing about volatile assets, no one knows shit about shit and anyone who says they do are either scamming you or just talking shit.

slvbtc

I think all hardware wallets should offer the option to create your own entropy (dice rolls etc), determine your own seed words, and then allow you to wnter the forst 23 seed words and let you choose the 24th word checksum. This way you can create a seed with your own entropy while never letting your seed words touch anything but a hardware wallet. Most hardware wallets make you use a seed generation file or 24th word checksum generator on an offline PC. This introduces risk for example if the file is malicious. A hardware wallet that generates your 24th word checksum for you should be an industry standard feature.

Relevant_Syllabub895

And to think that bitcoin when it started was worth cents and could be mined with the cpu, i kmew about it when it was worth 25$ each but i had no PC back them

genius_retard

Trezor XORs the output of the TRNGs from the PC it is connected to plus the one in its main CPU and the one(s) from its secure element(s).

JumpProfessional3372

I ordered an N100 16GB mini PC to use as Linux server. Might put a node in there as well.

missmuffin__

Did you leave your PC on reposting Reddit comments?

Ok-Mango5075

Very early software wallets about 13 years ago relied on androids built in random number generator to make a seed. This generator was faulty as well. This was patched out in subsequent android releases. Not long afterwards hardware devices were brought onto the market. I never found a compelling reason to trust them. I was a very active bitcoin user back then. First with Multibit on PC and then I was searching for an android self custody wallet. The first one arrived called Mycelium. Now this seemed a more sensible combination. An audited self custody wallet running on a mass market Android cell phone. Where are the back doors? Well as time has now shown...Not many.

bionicmixta

The great thing about using a hardware wallet is that your key is never exposed to your computer, so if your computer is hacked (now or in the future) the hacker doesn't get to see your keys. If you generate your own entropy, you then still need a way to find out what address(es) you should be sending your coins to. So with all the best entropy in the world, if you then type the seed words into your PC to find out your address, then your security posture is (potentially) worse than just using a hardware wallet on default settings.

Archophob

in 2010, my son was 4 years old and my daughter was a baby. No risk for either of them not to get conceived. I could buy a PC with a state-of-the-art graphics card, and mine 50 non-KYC bitcoins. Sell 10 of them in 2025, and still have 40 left by now.

Ok-Mango5075

Very early software wallets about 13 years ago relied on androids built in random number generator to make a seed. This generator was faulty as well. This was patched out in subsequent android releases. Not long afterwards hardware devices were brought onto the market. I never found a compelling reason to trust them. I was a very active bitcoin user back then. First with Multibit on PC and then I was searching for an android self custody wallet. The first one arrived called Mycelium. Now this seemed a more sensible combination. An audited self custody wallet running on a mass market Android cell phone. Where are the back doors? Well as time has now shown...Not many.

Dimlite31

Malware. If you know what you downloaded on PC, so no worries could be. And no antivirus needed at first, just firewall with proactive security. I mean storing crypto on a hot wallets it's not a problem, for me.

Accomplished-Net1378

# Trezor Safe 3 — How the BIP-39 recovery words are generated After tracing the firmware and PC-side code, the recovery words appear to be generated from **two separate sources of entropy**: one from the Safe 3 itself and one from the PC/host software. The overall chain is: PC / HOST │ │ generateEntropy(32) ▼ PC CSPRNG │ │ 32 bytes host entropy ▼ EntropyAck.entropy │ │ USB / protocol ▼ TREZOR SAFE 3 │ ├─────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ ▼ ▼ STM32 hardware RNG Host entropy │ │ │ 32 bytes │ 32 bytes ▼ │ int_entropy │ │ │ └──────────────┬──────────────────────┘ ▼ SHA-256(int_entropy || ext_entropy) │ ▼ 32-byte hash │ ▼ mnemonic_from_data() │ ▼ BIP-39 checksum + 11-bit word indexes │ ▼ BIP39 English wordlist │ ▼ 12 / 18 / 24 recovery words # 1. The PC generates 32 bytes of host entropy In the PC-side Trezor Connect code, `resetDevice (1).ts`, lines 61–65, the host calls: generateEntropy(32) and then sends the result as: EntropyAck { entropy } So the PC contributes **32 bytes of entropy** to the reset process. `generateEntropy()` is implemented in the PC-side entropy code, lines 9–24. It calls `randomBytes(len)` and requires a cryptographically secure random source. So: PC ↓ generateEntropy(32) ↓ randomBytes(32) ↓ 32 bytes host entropy ↓ EntropyAck.entropy The same `generateEntropy(32)` mechanism is used again during the entropy-check workflow (`resetDevice (1).ts`, lines 91–100 and 127–130). # 2. The host entropy travels to the Safe 3 The protocol contains two relevant messages: EntropyRequest ├── entropy_commitment └── prev_entropy EntropyAck └── entropy The important value for seed generation is `EntropyAck.entropy`. This becomes the firmware's `ext_entropy`. # 3. The Safe 3 generates its own entropy On the Safe 3, `reset.c` generates internal entropy with: random_buffer(int_entropy, sizeof(int_entropy)); The relevant code is around lines 288–304. `int_entropy` is **32 bytes**. The `random_buffer()` implementation for the STM32 build eventually calls the STM32 RNG peripheral. In the STM32 `rng.c`, the hardware RNG is read through: RNG->DR and `rng_get_u32()` / `rng_fill_buffer()` use those values to fill the requested buffer (STM32 `rng.c`, around lines 336–375). The generic `random_buffer()` wrapper is also shown in the STM32 RNG implementation around lines 66–85. So the device-side path is: STM32 hardware RNG ↓ RNG->DR ↓ rng_get_u32() ↓ rng_fill_buffer() ↓ random_buffer() ↓ 32-byte int_entropy # 4. The two entropy sources are combined This is the most important part. In `reset.c`, around lines 307–320, the firmware performs: SHA-256( int_entropy || ext_entropy ) In other words: 32 bytes from STM32 RNG + 32 bytes from PC CSPRNG ↓ SHA-256 ↓ final entropy The resulting SHA-256 output is stored as `secret`. So the final BIP-39 entropy is **not simply the raw STM32 RNG output** and it is **not simply the PC entropy**. It is the cryptographic combination of both. # 5. The SHA-256 result is passed to BIP-39 Immediately afterward, `reset.c`, around lines 314–321, does: mnemonic_from_data(secret, strength / 8) For the normal 256-bit case: STM32 entropy = 32 bytes PC entropy = 32 bytes ↓ SHA-256 ↓ 32-byte result ↓ BIP-39 entropy For the supported strengths: 128-bit → 16 bytes → 12 words 192-bit → 24 bytes → 18 words 256-bit → 32 bytes → 24 words # 6. BIP-39 converts the entropy into words Inside `bip39.c`, around lines 66–94, `mnemonic_from_data()`: 1. Takes the entropy. 2. Calculates SHA-256 of the entropy. 3. Takes the required checksum bits. 4. Appends the checksum to the entropy bits. 5. Splits the resulting bitstream into **11-bit groups**. 6. Each 11-bit value produces an index from `0` to `2047`. 7. That index selects a word from the 2048-word English BIP-39 word list. Conceptually: Final entropy ↓ SHA-256 ↓ checksum bits ↓ entropy + checksum ↓ 11-bit groups ↓ 0–2047 indexes ↓ BIP39_WORDLIST_ENGLISH ↓ recovery words For 256-bit entropy: 256 entropy bits + 8 checksum bits = 264 bits 264 / 11 = 24 words # Final conclusion Based on the source files traced above, the Safe 3 reset/new-wallet process uses **two entropy inputs**: 1. 32 bytes from the Safe 3's STM32 hardware RNG 2. 32 bytes from the PC-side cryptographically secure RNG (generateEntropy(32) → randomBytes(32)) Those are combined inside the Safe 3 firmware: SHA-256( STM32 hardware entropy || PC host entropy ) The resulting hash is then used as the BIP-39 entropy, which is converted into the 12/18/24 recovery words. So, in short: PC CSPRNG ───────────────┐ │ ▼ SHA-256 ▲ │ STM32 hardware RNG ──────┘ │ ▼ BIP-39 entropy │ ▼ BIP-39 encoding │ ▼ 12 / 18 / 24 words One important clarification: the **firmware hash is not the host entropy** in this chain. The host entropy is generated explicitly with `generateEntropy(32)` and sent as `EntropyAck.entropy`.

00-SilverShot

I'm doing the same thing. I upgraded from the Trezor Model T to a Safe 5. Just got it a couple days ago and planned on setting it up this weekend. Make sure there are no cameras around. Use SLIP-39 for the seed. I'll make my own random passphrase on paper (not using anything on PC to generate the passphrase). Store the seed and passphrase on metal backup. I have an older PC that I only use for Bitcoin and financial transactions. No normal web browsing. I'll only plug the wallet into this PC. Also, I'll load the xpub into Sparrow wallet so I can receive bitcoin without having to bust out the wallet itself (you need to do this with the Trezor app and it annoys me). A SLIP-39 generated seed, with a strong passphrase of random characters, and only transact using a super secure PC; that's enough for me.

JumpProfessional3372

Doing this in an offline air-gapped PC running a Linux live CD and then securely formatting it. It is also extremely low risk.

usx-tv

While I don’t disagree gambling insurance is bad, buying random shit like clothes or a PC is just as bad.

Electrical_Hat_680

Here is a complete, ready-to-copy Markdown summary tailored for a Reddit post. It provides an objective breakdown of using the Schildbach wallet in today's threat landscape, emphasizing critical architectural realities. ------------------------------ ## Title: The Original 2011 "Schildbach" Bitcoin Wallet in 2026: An Open-Source Alternative or a Security Risk? With recent supply chain and firmware security concerns surrounding popular hardware wallets like Coldcard, many in the community are looking backward at classic, purely open-source software architectures. One fascinating option still running today is the Schildbach Wallet (the original "Bitcoin Wallet" for Android, first released in 2011). Because it is completely decentralized and peer-to-peer, it bypasses corporate servers entirely. But is it actually viable as a hot or cold storage setup today? Here is a breakdown of how it works, where to get it, and the serious architectural trade-offs you need to know. ------------------------------ ## 🌐 Where to Find It Safely Because it was removed from the official Google Play Store due to evolving API policies, you must use verified, audited open-source repositories to avoid phishing clones: * The Source Code: Accessible on the official [bitcoin-wallet/bitcoin-wallet GitHub](https://github.com/bitcoin-wallet/bitcoin-wallet). * The Compiled App: Downloadable via F-Droid under the package identifier de.schildbach.wallet. F-Droid compiles the binary directly from the public source code, guaranteeing no hidden developer modifications. ------------------------------ ## 🛡️ Why It Appeals to Sovereign Users * True Peer-to-Peer Routing: Unlike modern wallets (which query centralized API servers like Blockstream, ElectrumX, or Alchemy to fetch your balance), Schildbach connects directly to the live Bitcoin network via SPV (Simplified Payment Verification). No middleman logs your IP address or XPUB. * No Corporate Dependency: There is no company infrastructure to go bankrupt, get hacked, or push a malicious remote firmware update. * Zero Altcoins: It is strictly Bitcoin-only, drastically limiting the application's attack surface and eliminating smart-contract logic bugs. ------------------------------ ## ⚠️ The Hidden Architectural Catch (Read Before Using!) While it sounds like an ideal sovereign wallet, its ancient codebase presents severe security and operational challenges in the modern threat landscape: ## 1. No Seed Phrase (Protobuf Backups Only) Modern wallets use a BIP-39 mnemonic seed phrase (12 or 24 words) that you can write on paper. Schildbach does not. It stores keys in a local database file called a Protobuf. * To back it up, you must export an encrypted file (bitcoin-wallet-backup-...) and set a manual password. * If your phone experiences hardware failure or water damage and you don't have that exact file and its matching password, your funds are permanently gone. ## 2. Network Sync Issues (SPV Vulnerabilities) Because it relies on mobile SPV syncing, your phone must crawl through the blockchain block-by-block over peer-to-peer connections. * If the app has been offline for months, it can take hours or days to sync. * In a hot wallet scenario where you need to make a fast transaction, the app may lag or temporarily show a zero balance while catching up. ## 3. Mobile OS Vulnerabilities Using a mobile phone as a "cold wallet" is highly discouraged. Even if the phone is kept completely offline, Android OS vulnerabilities, memory exploits, or physical device tampering present risks that dedicated, air-gapped hardware chips (Secure Elements) are specifically designed to prevent. ------------------------------ ## 📋 The Verdict: Hot or Cold? * As a Cold Wallet? ❌ Not recommended. Air-gapped hardware or dedicated multi-signature setups remain vastly superior. Relying on an old Android operating system and a single Protobuf backup file for long-term storage introduces too many physical and digital points of failure. * As a Hot Wallet / Hobby Project? Viable, but use caution. It is an incredible tool for learning about early Bitcoin P2P mechanics and running a sovereign mobile wallet. Just ensure you rigorously maintain off-device copies of your password-encrypted Protobuf backups. ------------------------------ If you post this to Reddit, the community will likely emphasize testing your Protobuf decryption workflow on a desktop PC before trusting it with significant funds. Let me know if you want to modify any specific section! ---- I used Googles AI Search Engine Assistant, after having it help me find the original Bitcoin Wallet Mobile App.

piejlucas

Did you also have a PIN ? Was the ledger connected to the PC when the transaction was broadcast ? What address did the coins go to ?

immersive-matthew

We really have no idea who is using what wallet. For sure many Bitcoins are in the Core Wallet, especially from the early days and so far there really has not been any big theft outside of bad opsec. if you are are an air gapped PC with the core wallet and your wallet.dat is never in a internet accessible machine via PSBT, history has shown it is a very safe option. No guarantees of course and to your point, more eyes are on the Full Node than the wallet, but that does not mean the core developers want to avoid a cold wallet situation with the core wallet as it would be devastating for Bitcoin’s reputation as it is as close to core as you can get with a wallet. The general wisdom is that hardware wallets are the safest, but so far history is favouring the core wallet and it almost certainly has more eyes on its code than cold wallet do and likely other hardware wallets too. With good opsec, both are great options, but one is tied directly to Bitcoin and has a lot more to loose than a corporate reputation.

NinjaBitcoiner

For me, I am trusting HW wallet entropy (example trezor,ledger etc) to generate 24 word seed phrase. On top of that i am using 6 to 8 word completely offline generated passphrase from Diceware list (passphrase don't have checksum issue) so you don't need PC to generate that. That passphrase over 256 bit TRNG Seed is very high security. Even if we assume HW TRNG fails to generate high entropy wallet, we are combining it with 8 word random passphrase that restore back the overall entropy.

SoftwareAble1643

It was bound to happen. Better now than later. Who enters their "secret 24 words" for an update? Was your brain on "fartmode" for 10 minutes straight. Get up from PC, get passphrase, return to PC, enter 24 words. Not at anytime did you think this is weird?

gacu-gacu

Same shit for me. I left PC on and went to a bar. After lots of beers I checked amount and concluded that whatever I get in BTC would show up on my elctricity bill at the end of month. Then deleted app without backing up wallet. Wasnt worth it because I would have to explain to parents whats the deal with electric bill and bigger issue was to replace PC after some time. Btc was maybe $1 back then.

gacu-gacu

Same shit for me. I left PC on and went to a bar. After lots of beers I checked amount and concluded that whatever I get in BTC would show up on my elctricity bill at the end of month. Then deleted app without backing up wallet. Wasnt worth it because I would have to explain to parents whats the deal with electric bill and bigger issue was to replace PC after some time. Btc was maybe $1 back then.

gacu-gacu

Same shit for me. I left PC on and went to a bar. After lots of beers I checked amount and concluded that whatever I get in BTC would show up on my elctricity bill at the end of month. Then deleted app without backing up wallet. Wasnt worth it because I would have to explain to parents whats the deal with electric bill and bigger issue was to replace PC after some time. Btc was maybe $1 back then.

daninet

Same for me with btc, i have mined it on my Dad's powerful PC he used for work and after a few days it was like 0.3 btc so i deleted all with the wallet it was practically worthless. This is what time machines are for I guess 🥲

rgnet1

The guarantee that standard computers are able to generate entropy for encryption is that every single piece of encrypted data online has remained fine. Every SSL certificate for every website is not generated with a Coldcard-like device but just a regular ol’ PC. Anyone can generate a secure seed without a hardware wallet and just use the wallet for signing. They can roll dice or use battle-tested .SecureRandom methods in decade old crypto libs for any language. This is why Coldcard is the bum in this case - it failed to do what every other general purpose device has done fine for decades, because of one awful bit of code that said “if true rng fails, do it silently, and use this pseudo rng process instead.” Show me any encryption software anywhere for general purpose PCs that does this. Ask an LLM to go find it.

xiskghferx

No you don't need HW wallet, you can easily use e.g. Electrum in cold mode on the offline PC. But it has to bo offline 100% of time, always, forever.

pythosynthesis

Avoid websites unless they're open source and have been for years. And even then, download the code to your own PC. The one OP provides is good. Others are questionable.

AgsAreUs

An air gapped (no Wi-Fi card, no Bluetooth, Ethernet cable never plugged in) PC running Sparrow for offline signing is a pretty good solution. Only real attack vector is using a USB drive to transfer the transaction to be signed. A cheap web cam and QR codes can fix that.

Sector__7

You’re right, it sure has made an impact on the world as it’s far too expensive nowadays to buy/build a computer as 2/3 of the main parts to a PC are extraordinarily overpriced due to AI sucking up all of the supply.

UhhCanYouLikeShutUp

It's like I did when I actually mined them in the beginning and never wrote the seed down... Because NOBODY back then understood what that meant. At one I had a couple HUNDRED btc. PC went to shit, threw it out never thinking that that "Internet money" would actually be worth something!!

crunchyeyeball

There are plenty of others, e.g.: [1BitcoinEaterAddressDontSendf59kuE](https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/addresses/btc/1BitcoinEaterAddressDontSendf59kuE) 1111111111111111111114oLvT2 just happens to be the most widely recognised since it's just about the simplest possible *valid* address, like redirecting output to */dev/null* on a PC. As for *why* someone might do this... honestly, your guess is as good as mine. Most was sent back when bitcoin was worth a lot less, so it may not have been a big deal. Maybe some kind of test transactions? Maybe an accident? Maybe an unwanted donation that the recipient didn't want? Maybe accumulated prize money for a competition nobody won? [Wired magazine burned some bitcoin in 2013](https://www.wired.com/story/wired-lost-bitcoin/) after generating it while testing miners, and deciding they shouldn't keep it since it could be a conflict of interest with their reporting.

S0l1DTvirusSnak3

I look in to who ever has been around your PC...

Deras-belly10

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xiskghferx

Also, you can throw your 128bit entropy with dice totally offline on paper, OK. But, then you NEED some device or sofware to calculate the checksum and define the last word! You cannot calculate SHA256 by hand and calculator. How you are supposed to do this? Yes, you can use Python on offline PC to do this, but it suddenly becomes much more complicated.

WraithsOnWings2023

I'd be asking to see this dudes Steam library because if he's on a PC at least 12 hours a day he's definitely gaming too.

magma_lakes

You can trust yourself, a coin, a piece of paper, and an air-gapped Linux PC you've set up yourself with software **you** selected.

metalzip

Multisignature is the solution, make it among good wallets, 4of5 - trezor (securely sourced) - bitbox or jade... perhaps ledger even - old laptop, intel, with devuan or debian, bitcoin core, offline - old laptop, intel, (other vendor) with openbsd or some other os, bitcoin core, offline - yet other PC/laptop with yet other vendor/os, perhaps other node software make backups, encrypted properly, do not lose encryption key backups either, test it form months, and then check each month do you remember passwords

Linkamus

Airgap a regular PC (just unplug ethernet, disable wifi and bluetooth, etc) with sparrow wallet on it and put it in a sparrow hot wallet IMMEDIATELY. This is the fastest way to get your funds off of the coldcard with minimal risk. You can then later create a transaction on the air-gapped PC to send the funds to a new hardware wallet, transfer the signed transaction file, and broadcast it on an internet-connected PC. DO NOT RESPOND TO DMS, AS THEY WILL BE SCAMMERS 99% OF THE TIME.

Thin_Needleworker795

Yeah but poor entropy is not the only flaw you might run into. There's a whole plethora of other attacks, and you are opening up your attack surface a lot by using a PC, even if you turn off the internet. It is not a safe method for cold storage, and no cyber security expert will ever recommend you do this.

Bkokane

Software wallet seems a lot more unsafe than exchanges tbh. 99% of the “my funds are gone” posts on here are from people generating a wallet on their android/PC and subsequently getting the seed stolen. I would only ever do this as a temporary wallet to move funds and then discard it.

Green_Bar_8851

I didn't clarify on that, my suggestion is disconnect the ethernet from the source (motherboard) in case of a laptop and the ethernet cable in case of a Desktop PC, use a bootable usb with debian live or Tails OS, install sparrow and generate everything offline. When shutting down the computer nothing is saved. Its a option.

magma_lakes

Linux PC + 256 random bits from coin flipping with the von Neumann method.

dogoru

I guess now you have to upgrade your hardware wallet just like your PC.

riscten

You mean 50 total bits? Take a look at this chart: [https://www.reddit.com/r/dataisbeautiful/comments/322lbk/time\_required\_to\_bruteforce\_crack\_a\_password/](https://www.reddit.com/r/dataisbeautiful/comments/322lbk/time_required_to_bruteforce_crack_a_password/) A high end gaming PC can brute force a password with 50 bits of entropy in a few hours.

Tcash9

You feel safe putting your Savings in a hot BTC Core wallet on your PC/laptop? Only way I'd do that is to NEVER connect it to Wifi or Ethernet cable....

boddankajovanovic

Bad advice as written. Some newbies will try this on an Internet connected PC exposing their quasi private key directly to potential malware. Never do this on an Internet connected device.

MobiusNaked

Yeah I'm still on Coinbase. That's because Bitcoin is 10% of my portfolio and I can't be arsed working out another technology where if I screw up I could lose everything. Unlike building my own PC, NAS or vibe coding some databases, this is just a step too far that I just can't be bothered with.

omg_its_dan

I think as long as long as you do the dice rolls properly (ie use fair dice and do enough rolls) then the output can be trusted as random. I can’t speak specifically to the keystone though, I am still deciding. Air gapped means that the seed phrase never touches another device with a cable. With one of these wallets you need to load transactions on an SD card and sign it with the device, then move the signed transaction file back to your PC to broadcast the final transaction. It adds a step but isn’t too difficult. My thinking is with a multisig setup it’s ok to use one non air gapped device, because even if that was hacked somehow, you can’t move any funds with only one seed. This will mean that when I want to send, I’ll sign the transaction via the trezor connected to my computer, plus an air gapped signature on the keystone or cold >!card.!<

haddock420

Am I the only one who still uses a wallet.dat file on my PC with Bitcoin Core?

haddock420

Am I the only one who still uses a wallet.dat file on my PC with Bitcoin Core?

Firone

Thanks! People usually have a knee-jerk reaction to it, so your open-mindedness is appreciated. Previously, I considered my singleHW a single point of failure: if you were kidnapped with it and tortured you would give its password. But this can be solved with a trick PIN which resets the HW: you input it and then your kidnappers can't do anything: the seed is no longer there and they must obtain the 2/3 backups. (Though you'd probably want to work on the kidnapping not happening, lmao) The other possible issue is what we've seen with ColdCard, but I don't see how it could ever happen again. The (real) top tier hardware wallets already use multiple sources of randomness. Even if the ultimate AI came out tomorrow, I don't think it would be able to extract the seed from a top tier hardware wallet. Even if a bug allowing this would be found, the attacker would need to steal your HW or hack the PC/phone you're using with it too, so not really a single point of failure I would say

rgnet1

I’m sad to see most of the replies you got are mired in minutiae of where the coins are “stored” and overexplaining blockchain to you. While it’d be good to understand that properly, the simple answer to your actual post - the process you described to safely hold bitcoin - is theoretically sound. Generate the wallet (which is really the act of generating a seed phrase) on an offline device and never bring it online. That is correct. The recent fiasco with Coldcard though has shattered confidence in the generation of seed phrases - Coldcard made the wallets entirely offline but the phrase was brute force guessed because it wasn’t using a true random generation. So all that matters is whatever you use on your device - Android phone as you mentioned - definitely uses proper encryption standards when generating. Another poster recommended instead booting from TailsOS on a USB stick with Electrum installed, keep the PC offline and generate the wallet. This is a method used since the earliest days and is battle tested.

tenuousemphasis

The whole point of hardware wallets is to not need an airgapped PC. If you can properly set up one of those, you don't need a hardware wallet.

metalzip

> Generate seed with dice entropy. You are safe until the heat death of universe. Sleep fine. No, then you simply hack your device, which happened countless times. You are wrong, and so is the OP. Delete (edit) this misleading posts. The correct way: - use cold wallet (offline computer) - protects you against being hacked in future, and from hacks that would steal your private key/seed (but does not protect you if the device, as result of hacking or programming mistakes like with ColdCard, generates keys that can be guessed easily by anyone or by some group) - try to use secure system. e.g. hardware wallet, or old laptop with secure OS (like linux, openbsd; verify all downloads), with secure software if it's a computer (Bitcoin Core. Might also use Electrum too) - use multisignature such as 2 of 3, or perhaps 3 of 5, and try to vary the systems, use different combinations, not e.g. all to be old laptops from same one guy who knows you like Bitcoins, not all to be e.g. Ubuntu, consider not all to be Bitcoin Core - so that if it turns out one of these was compromised, still attacker probably doesn't have enough of your keys to take coins. For example get: 1) old laptop, debian, bitcoin core 2) old laptop from other vendor, openbsd, bitcoin core (older version, but the patched subversion of it) 3) old laptop from yet other vendor, Fedora, bitcoin core (build from source code) even better if one of them is a serious hardware wallet, that can work with PSBT (partially signed bitcoin transaction), perhaps a Trezor. One or 2 of the node softwares on PC-like computers/laptops can be Electrum (though it did had long ago a serious remote exploit related to html display). Probably even better is 4of5, with 2 trezors, laptops could be of different model and brand, perhaps one of them on amd not intel. Then if it turns out in next 10 years that "img, XYZ was backdoored/evil" then you are still safe; where XYZ can be: all intel CPUs, or all Electrum nodes, or given version of Bitcoin Core (very unlikely but still yea), or all Trezors, or all Cold Cards. Finally, remember to NOT over-do it, I know many people (me included) that lost wealth (or all of it, sad) due to being too secure, forgetting passwords or PINs, or not heaving a backup in case of physical media failure, so do 2-4 backups. And check them: the next day, 3 days later, 1 week, month, then each half year. After first week you are ready to send serious funds there.

_2f

But what if it’s a hardware wallet where you input dice rolls, and a software bug prevents the dice entropy from being used when generating a seed? The only way is to generate it yourself using dice as 512/256 bits on an air gapped PC but you also have to trust the transaction signing software that it does not have an exploit.  Point of the matter is - unfortunately there’s almost no way to do it 100% secure and trustless. 

IllllIIlIllIllllIlll

I use an air gapped wallet yes (keystone). But even the USB ones are still way safer than a software wallet that you use on a regular PC or phone that can be riddled with malware in so many more ways.

classified_x

I am a bit ignorant of how cold wallets work, although I did move a lot of crypto over the past years (dont hold any no more)... but isn't it a bit obvious that if you put a magnet over your Trezor for instance, or it gets underwater or heated, it could be lost? what then? I think trusting a small company or a hardware wallet to a far extent is not the "right thing" to do. I myself got shafted in exchanges then simply held an Electrum wallet in my PC... with keys to it on various USB sticks, protected by pw... I moved thousands of dollars with no issue, over about 3-4 years

RetiredAvocado

There is no "official" implementation of bitcion. Bitcoin Core is one of many. Creating a wallet on internet connected PC running Bitcoin Core is not cold storage. Deleting everything could be too late. Hardware wallets separate internet connected OS with possible malware from the keys and does its signing on the chip in the device. Bitcoin Core does not do that.

Mystohaxen

If Claude can hack into any random BTC wallet, the crypto space is toast. As long as he didn’t leave the seed on his PC or anything accessible from the internet that Claude could hack it should be a safe bet.

FrozenTire

Initially setting up my wallet using Bitcoin QT, I always wondered if I was doing it wrong this whole time. The PC is long gone, but I still have my keys.

Smiletaint

Get your coins. Make your own cold wallet with an old Ethernet only PC. Use a Linux distro. Store coins in cold wallet. Make a backup of your wallet with said pc and a usb stick you can put in a safe. Only make transactions with your coins on said pc over Ethernet. Hide your fucking phrase and don’t lose it. What is so hard? The only real threat to your bitcoin is quantum computing and not doing as I stated above.

Aazimoxx

Early adopter over there, he just mined some 50-blocks on his shitbox PC and forgot the passphrase, but might remember it one day...

Defiant_Leg_6335

Bitcoin si archivia su un portafoglio creato su Bitcoin Core installato su un PC che normalmente non si accende o si usa per accedere ad Internet. Portafoglio protetto da password impossibile da decifrare. L’unico problema a quel punto è trovare il modo di archiviare in modo sicuro la password. Magari di tanto in tanto, ogni qualche anno, spostare i Bitcoin su un nuovo indirizzo.

magma_lakes

You don't necessarily need to trust any device's random number generator (RNG). As long as you can trust that the device is offline and correctly generates an HD wallet from an initial entropy source, feed the device with your own entropy, such as from flipping a coin or rolling dice. Even better, use an air-gapped Linux PC with open-source software that YOU'VE selected, and feed it your own entropy.

magma_lakes

Generate your wallet by tossing a coin using the von Neumann extractor method, in order to cancel out any bias the coin may have. Toss the coin twice, if you get: HT -> 0 bit TH -> 1 bit HH -> reject TT -> reject Repeat that 256 times. This guarantees that - even if the coin is biased - you are still mathematically guaranteed to have a 50/50 chance of obtaining a 0 or 1 bit. You can then use that private key to generate a public key and address on an offline Linux PC, or an entire Bitcoin wallet, if you so desire.

magma_lakes

Generate a wallet on an air-gapped Linux PC. It's probably the biggest pain to work with and the least intuitive, but it's the safest way to store your BTC, if done right.

FragrantLunatic

no. look up custodial vs non. and deterministic vs non. this was not bitcoin bitcoin. yea i know how this sounds but it is what it is. if ur PC gets hacked, it wasn't bitcoins fault. airgap is a thing

Lanky_Assist_6317

I remember when I had to plug my upgraded fixed telephone cable into my desktop PC to access internet. It only took me 25 minutes to download "Linking Park - In The End.mp3" and play in my Winamp player. Jokes apart, I also believe this is the way we should be heading. For Bitcoin to succeed, everything needs to be simplified. If you need to make 100 dice rolls to be safe, it's never going mainstream.

Such_Huckleberry3440

This is the way. Sold my gaming PC last year and dumped it all in, no regrets. People think I'm crazy but they don't see the long game

Massakahorscht

The best would be the specter DIY. But you have to buy all parts, creating your own seed by dice Andy counter coin System and stuff. It will not be generated by the PC and all parts are bought by different companies. Software you can use different one you choose on the device and as connection on the PC. I think it is the most secure( also nice big Display like a Smartphone and easy to put password inside etc). But because it is so much to Do by yourself many dont choose it. I want to see into it in the future, is also a nice Hobby style project

daxtaslapp

Not only that but even just phishing scams through emails, or whatever on your PC you always gotta be scared

Lissanro

I think it is a matter of education. Even if using traditional fiat credit card there are plenty of ways to get scammed if not careful. Myself, I always have been skeptical of so called "cold wallets", cold cards, etc. Just having separate phone or cheap mini PC intended only to handle crypto is something I felt is more secure, with disabled updates and using fixed versions of wallet app. Having few devices with unrelated fixed wallet apps is even more secure, especially if all internet access except what is needed to access blockchain is disabled; on a phone it is a matter of installing firewall app and setting it up so only wallet app has internet access to specific servers, which is acrually quick and easy to do once learned how to do it. Money that is needed currently can be on the main phone or PC for easy access, but my suggestion is never put all life saving to one app, one device, etc. I also not saying there no secure cold wallets, there are but looking for them, doing all the research and setup that is necessary, and repeating to have multiple different ones, is not really any simpler than just setting up phones or mini PCs securely, because either way you have to learn and understand the details or put you blind trust into something you do not understand and risk paying for the consequences.

vulnid

They have safety protocols built in too, just depends on the model and if its more or less. There is both US/China and a bunch of other types of local public open source models that do not have any safety protocols at all and can be abused as such. Just need a decent PC

SpareEconomy1849

Yeah kinda dumb that they have 6 different colors and they are all ugly. I think it fits with the functionality though, you gotta export a file to the SD card, sign, move back to your PC, then upload etc all with some 3rd party open source app. I prefer it, but it's definitely not appealing to the average person

disruptioncoin

Makes me happy the trezor one uses two sources of entropy: one half from it's own TRNG (analog noise sampling basically) and one half from the host PC's entropy pool (multiple entropy sources including CPU hardware RNG, TPM, interrupt timing, etc.). Either one could be compromised/broken and the other would pull it's weight. But I do like the idea of hand rolled seeds...